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Is This the Final Issue of the 
Bulletin? 
 
s this the last issue of the Bulletin? As secretary-
treasurer of the NAPTS and editor of the Bulle-
tin since 1997, I certainly hope that the answer is a 
resounding no. However, you the reader are to 
decide. The summer issue is the annual dues issue, 
and we need everyone who reads the bulletin, ei-
ther electronically or by hard copy, to send in his 
or her dues as soon as possible. The back cover of 
this bulletin is available for your convenience. 
Please send in any change in address or e-mail. 
 Anyone who can afford a tax-deductible con-
tribution to the Society for the Bulletin is urged to 
do so. (The tax-free number of the Society is 
available upon request.) 
 The Society has been running in the red since 
the Spring Bulletin. In fact, the Spring Bulletin’s 
copy and mailing expenses were covered as a 
courtesy to the Society by the Religious Studies 
Department of Santa Clara University. The 
NAPTS expresses it sincere thanks to Vicky Gon-
zalez of the Religious Studies Department for her 
support and assistance. 
So please remember: Dues are due!  
And many thanks. 
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New Publications 
 
Lounibos, John B. “Paul Tillich’s Kenotic Tendency,” 
in Self-Emptying of Christ and the Christian: Three 
Essays on Kenosis, pp. 66-84. Eugene, Oregon: 
Wipf & Stock, 2011. www.wipfandstock.com. 
Prof. Lounibos is Professor Emeritus of Religion 
and Ethics at Dominican College, Blauvelt, New 
York. 
 
The 19th Colloque International de 
l’Association Paul Tillich 
d’Expression française 
 
he 19th Colloque International de 
l’Association Paul Tillich d’Expression fran-
çaise was held in Brussels at the Eglise Protestante 
de Bruxelles-Musée on 27–29 May 2011. The 
theme of the conference was “Tillich interprete de 
l’Histoire/ Tillich’s Interpretations of History.” 
Participants delivering papers in French were from 
Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, Brazil, 
and Canada. Two sessions were devoted to papers 
in English, with participants from the U.K., the 
U.S.A., and Austria. Participants were welcomed 
by Anne Marie Reijnen, President of the APTEF. 
Professor Jean Richard (Laval) delivered the ple-
nary address and public lecture, entitled 
“L’histoire a-t-elle un sens?” His lecture, in the 
Chapelle Royale, was followed by a short organ 
concert. Attendees were invited to a chapel service 
at the Chapelle Royale on Sunday, May 29. The 
service was followed by a “petite promenade” 
through Brussels, to observe sites of interest in the 
history of Protestantism. Information will be 
forthcoming regarding publication of the Proceed-
ings of the Conference. 
 
—GUY B. HAMMOND 
 
Tillich’s Emulation of Buber 
 
Durwood Foster 
 
uber and dialogue are nearly synonymous, 
and Tillich too showed proclivity for it—from 
the 1912 Kulturabende for doubting Berliners to 
the Union privatissimum and Chicago’s finale with 
Eliade. The salient encounters with Urban and Hi-
samatsu are tips of what we glimpse in the 1936 
Travel Diary’s orgy of conversations. As Paulus 
avers of ST I, the published theology hums 
throughout from “underground” wrestling with 
contemporaries [ST I, 1951, vii]. These were many 
and diverse, and one of the more under-noticed, 
but long-term was the icon of dialogue himself. 
Arguably, after 1920, no thinker had a greater im-
pact on Paulus more persistently than Martin Bu-
ber did.   
 Tillich and Buber are mostly mentioned to-
gether at loggerheads; the point was that Paulus 
should have but did not listen to the Jewish pundit. 
As Robison James likes to put it, there is a “deficit 
of the personal” in Tillich’s God that ought to be 
corrected by Buber’s I-Thou. [Tillich and Inter-
religious Dialogue, 141ff.] Rob’s plaint deserves a 
hearing, but beyond as well as within the issue of 
the “Personal God,” we need to register the mani-
fold positive import for Tillich of interaction with 
Buber—a phenomenon not duly appreciated. Go 
back to fulminating Berlin, 1924. The eight-years-
older, once Zionist scholar, established ally of 
Franz Rosenzweig, had just authored I and Thou. 
His impingement on Dozent Tillich began dra-
matically at a religious socialist rally. With con-
cessions and counterpoints it swelled sporadically 
till 1965, when Buber died and four months later 
Tillich—though not before penning a remarkable 
eulogy to the Jewish friend now envisaged as 
prime ideal of his own career. [The original publi-
cation was in Christian News from Israel, XVI, 3, 
25-8. I have used the German translation in GW, 
XII, 320-3]. Barely three pages, this document 
should be must reading for all who would under-
stand Tillich. 
 Anchored in the homage to Buber is Paulus’s 
vocational “last will and testament.” By this I 
mean the final public utterance in Chicago, calling 
for experience rooted universal openness—a the-
ology free “both from one’s own foundation and 
for one’s own foundation” [“The Significance of 
the History of Religions for the Systematic Theo-
logian,” Main Works, 6, 441]. Gert Hummel found 
freedom “for one’s own foundation”—“ganz unk-
lar und aus Tillichs Werken...nicht zu erschlies-
sen...” [Ibid, p. 445]. Actually, I think the meaning 
is discernible in view of Tillich’s work as a whole, 
as explained in my 2010 NAPTS banquet address 
in Atlanta [Now available on the Tillich website]. 
“Theology of culture,” unbound by any traditional 
norm, was Paulus’s first great vocational passion. 
But then (somewhat bigamously), he also es-
poused as a systematic thinker his own tradition’s 
T 
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birthright, the concrete norm of Jesus Christ. For 
most of his life and work, the two freedoms—both 
from and for his Christian heritage—were for Pau-
lus not smoothly in sync. Nor intriguingly was 
what he owed Buber acknowledged through the 
main decades of the celebrated career—in the au-
tobiographical On the Boundary of 1934, as well 
as in citing sources of his thinking. In 1954, and 
again in 1960, Paulus does not mention Buber. 
However, grateful awareness did blossom on the 
Israel visit, October 1963, to come forth with 
poignant emphasis in the climactic tribute. In any 
case, it seems incontestable that manifold indebt-
edness to the Jewish luminary was pivotal in blaz-
ing the challenging trail our mentor left us. 
 In 1924, addressing Berlin’s religiously mixed 
would-be socialists, Dozent Tillich, known for his 
beacon essay, “On a Theology of Culture,” main-
tained the ideal that socialism must indeed be re-
ligious but avoid the trappings of particular relig-
ions. The term “God,” for example, should be 
supplanted by general concepts like “what con-
cerns us ultimately.” This was in tune with the 
1919 essay. But from the audience arose a figure 
looking like a biblical prophet—as Buber did—
loudly protesting “abstract facades” could never 
bear the meaning of “God.” “He was right,” Pau-
lus affirms in 1965 [op. cit., p. 320]. Whatever was 
said that frenetic earlier night, the point sank in 
that the biblical, personal God is conceptually un-
translatable, fueling decades of internal Tillichian 
struggle but also enfranchising afresh what Paulus 
in 1919 had demoted—the parallel normativity, 
alongside cultural ontology, of church theology. In 
his encomium for the Jewish prophet, Tillich is 
even convinced the dramatic buttonholing by 
Buber enabled resumption of his Christian preach-
ing—without which he would not be our Tillich 
[op. cit., p. 321]. Further, the following year, the 
Marburg Dogmatik firmly maintains that God is 
always experienced as “personhaft”; absoluteness 
is required, but the Absolute could not be God for 
us without personalness (which of course does not 
mean being “a” finite person) [Dogmatik, 
Schüssler edition, pp. l62-67]. Paulus had moved 
from Berlin and the strict allegiance he once 
pledged to theology of culture. Rehabilitated not 
only as Christian preacher but also as church theo-
logian, Paulus taught systematics at Marburg, des-
tined to attain in that genre too, as well as in cul-
tural theology, creative eminence. The unsettled 
unity of the two genres bespeaks graphically not 
only of the bifocality of Tillich but also of Buber, 
lifelong a witness to the Mosaic covenant, but 
equally if not more so, a philosopher of un-
bounded import. Both scholars were lauded yet 
somewhat distrusted by in-house constituencies. 
Both were banned by the Nazis and attained pro-
fessorial renown abroad. Both hoped to wed, more 
than reality would grant, the mystical with the po-
litical, but kept on insisting the vertical and hori-
zontal are not dis-joinable. Soulmates they mani-
foldly were, yet with many differences.   
 1. From Tillich’s own witness, the first and 
lasting Buberian influence on him is clearly the 
restitution to top normativity of the biblical per-
sonal God, along with or corresponding to—or 
somehow primordially identical with—the onto-
logical absolute. The latter was already in place 
for Paulus, a lifelong intuitive certitude. The 
“somehow” of its identification with the biblical 
God was never totally clarified—naturally enough 
since the linkage was seen to be grounded in un-
forethinkable (unvordenklich, as Paulus would 
sometimes cite from Schelling) transcendence. But 
after 1924, the Christ norm was never given up by 
Tillich either, though it was obscured by the epi-
sode of the “God beyond God,” as expounded in 
The Courage to Be of 1952.               
 2. Inseparable from this first point is the way 
Buber compels Tillich early and again later and 
finally to embrace pansymbolism with respect to 
conceptual expression of God. Some, including I 
surmise Rob James, have been horrified at the 
thought, but Tillich was persuaded by Urban to 
repudiate pansymbolism for only several years, 
during which “being-itself” was proposed as “the 
only non-symbolic” expression for God. Then 
came in 1957 the introduction to Systematic The-
ology II, with its unambiguous insistence that the 
sole expression is that “all statements about God 
are symbolic.” This is pansymbolism, but a so-
phisticated version in which there is lucid concep-
tual awareness that the unforethinkable Origin of 
all is uniquely uncontainable in any finite word or 
notion. As Augustine classically said, “si compre-
henderis non est deus.” Where does Buber come 
in? Tillich’s 1957 change from “being-itself” back 
to (a more recondite) pansymbolism was prompted 
in part by the contentions of Randall, Hartshorne, 
and Emmet, as found in the Kegley-Bretall vol-
ume. But a rereading of Buber’s Eclipse of God of 
1952 has convinced me these lectures by the Jew-
ish sage (mainly given just across the street from 
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Union Seminary) were in all likelihood the most 
effective solvent in Paulus’s demotion of esse ip-
sum to a border status, both symbolic and non-
symbolic, more or less on a par with several other 
expressions such as “the unconditional.” Buber 
forcefully rejects “being itself” as equal to the role 
Heidegger would assign it, setting forth his own 
pansymbolism with respect to God in the same 
context.  
 3. A third and incontestable influence on Til-
lich was Buber’s thematization of how the moral 
self is constituted through personal encounter—the 
I-Thou relationship. Here unconditional obligation 
reveals itself; the usage of “things” would other-
wise have no limit [ST III, pp. 40f]. Tillich saw 
this as a fundamental contribution to modern cul-
ture, one which he definitely accepted. 
 4. Deserving place in our list is also the exis-
tentially enacted, that is, lived union of the vertical 
and the horizontal. Many teach the conjunction of 
religion and ethics, but Tillich names no one as 
saliently as he does Buber for the inspiring incar-
nation of their merger. Paulus perceived and emu-
lated in his Jewish friend a numinous prophetic 
presence in which the religious dimension was 
mystically personal and the ethical laden with so-
cio-political relevance.          
 5. I am unaware of notice in the literature of 
how Buber’s Two Types of Faith of 1951 bears 
upon Tillich’s 1957 Dynamics of Faith, though 
surely this is a matter that invites study. The for-
mer lifts up emunah (the root of “Amen”—
meaning acceptance of what or who grounds one’s 
life) as the original biblical type of faith, over 
against the “holding for true” (Fürwahrhalten) of 
incompletely provable factual allegations, which 
Buber links to pistis. There is obvious congruency 
here with Tillich’s contrast of faith and belief. One 
could easily imagine, in fact, that Paulus’s treatise 
was authored partly with the intention of disarm-
ing Buber’s view that Christian faith tends to for-
sake Hebraic emunah and be of the second (Für-
wahrhalten or “belief”) type. I hope further explo-
ration of Tillich’s unpublished archives will some-
day illuminate this matter.  
 6. Finally, not to be omitted from any such list 
is the “From and For” one’s own tradition man-
date, Tillich’s consummating formula for the way 
forward in theology and religious studies. He sees 
this ideal finely achieved in Buber and wishes his 
own career might have better served it. It means 
presumably that those who share his vision should 
earnestly espouse both the goal of theology (criti-
cally re-appropriating one’s own most spiritual 
roots) and at the same time the goal of religious 
studies (the wider ecumenical academy, world dia-
logue, etc.). True, this may not in toto seem practi-
cal and may require a kind of tentative schizo-
phrenia. A synthesis of aim or means is indeed 
remote. Yet, many of us are committed to the 
struggle, and we do have at least two great role 
models.  
 
Tillich’s Kairos and its Trajectory 
 
Ronald Stone 
 
aul Tillich’s intimate discussion group in Ber-
lin after World War I came to bear the name of 
the Kairos Circle. The term kairos has continued 
through history to be affirmed by circles of Chris-
tian believers and their allies who have wanted to 
radically change their societies. 
 Within the Kairos Circle, it was a resolution to 
the debate between activists and determinists who 
insisted that history would carry its own solutions 
forward. Action was needed, but it had to be in 
tune with the properties of the contemporary his-
tory, which were open to radical change. Theo-
logically, Tillich meant the term to bear the weight 
of the intersection of eternity and historical action. 
For him it meant in 1922 that history was ripe for 
the fulfillment of the ideas of the religious social-
ists. By 1932, he understood religion would have 
to radically change to be open to socialism, and 
socialism would have to radically change to be 
open to the ultimate claims of religion. 
  In Berlin in 1951, Tillich would say that the 
religious socialist ideas of the interwar period 
were basically correct. He expressed the kairos as 
the Kingdom of God that was both transcendent 
and historical. In history, the Kingdom of God was 
only fragmentarily present. He thought the concept 
of the Kingdom of God pointed to fulfillment only 
in its vertical dimension. Still it encouraged his-
torical action in its immanent dimension. In his 
personal opinion, the kairos lay ahead only in the 
distant future. He was speaking in Germany under 
American and Russian domination, but in decolo-
nization and the civil rights movement elsewhere 
in the world, moments of kairos were producing 
significant breakthroughs in mixtures of socialism, 
religion, and liberalism. Maybe the 1922 statement 
was more utopian than he admitted. The 1951 
P 
Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 37, 3, Summer 2011 5 
statement was unnecessarily confined to the con-
text of the cold war, but, as he said in the System-
atic Theology of 1963, the concept of kairos had a 
life of its own. There he admits the term was 
partly, and only partly, confirmed in the period of 
its emergence. His definition was: “Its original 
meaning—the right time, the time in which some-
thing can be done—must be contrasted with chro-
nos, measured time or clock time. The former is 
qualitative, the later quantitative.”1 He argues that 
its use in the New Testament shows it to reveal the 
maturity of time in which the Kingdom of God 
may manifest itself. But he notes the power to re-
sist the Kingdom can also be magnified at the 
same time. He correctly notes the Biblical attribu-
tion of the term to both Jesus and Paul, and mis-
takenly to John the Baptist.2 
 Tillich notes the term has other Greek uses 
than the New Testament use, and he does not enter 
into any particular exegesis of the term. Lon 
Weaver has developed the exegesis of different 
connotations to the term in the New Testament and 
noted its rare usage in the Septuagint.3 Weaver 
notes how Tillich was partially wrong in his ex-
pectations of kairos, and he believes Tillich at-
tached positive moral meaning to the term that it 
did not deserve. Tillich is careful in the Systematic 
Theology to note the concept can be used destruc-
tively, and, in sentences reminiscent of his quarrel 
with Emmanuel Hirsch, he mentions the demonic 
distortion of the idea by the Nazis. The apprehen-
sion of kairoi is in vision and involves risk as one 
or a group may be mistaken. An examination of 
the trajectory of the concept risks judgments on 
whether a group was correct in its perception of 
the kairos or not. For Tillich a correct perception 
required correlation to the reality of the Christ in 
Jesus, including the willingness to sacrifice the 
self for the cause. Prideful, self-serving move-
ments could not be expressing an authentic kairos. 
Finally, he said the true Kairos is unique and the 
kairoi or lesser expressions of historical fulfill-
ment are rare. History often proceeds without 
glimpses of kairos. 
 Contemporary use of the term different from 
Tillich’s includes the consort of singers from the 
Holy Cross Monastery (a young adult retreat cen-
ter), many prison ministries, a publishing house, a 
Canadian relief agency of the churches, a technical 
agency, and studies in rhetoric that find the term 
being used by various ancient Greek authorities, 
including Protagoras and Hippocrates. An alterna-
tive connotation of the term is associated with Kai-
ros, the youngest of Zeus’s offspring and the god 
of opportunity. This apparently led to financial 
consulting firms taking the title. The inquiry of 
these reflections focuses on six theological groups 
encouraging action fit to the times.  
 
Kairos and Peacemaking 
  
The Presbyterian General Assembly may have 
been the earliest Church body to pick up the sym-
bol of Kairos and make it part of its official teach-
ing. In 1980, in a period of national discourage-
ment over the retreat from Vietnam, Russian asser-
tiveness, the revolution in Iran, and economic 
stagnation, this Church saw an opportunity for a 
new emphasis upon peacemaking. It launched a 
program of peacemaking, sponsored an all church 
special offering to support it; it hired additional 
staff to work on the issues to change the con-
sciousness of the church to equip its members to 
engage in peacemaking, and to witness for peace 
to the nation. Its founding policy, Peacemaking: 
The Believer’s Calling, called Presbyterians to 
claim their vocation as peacemakers and an-
nounced peacemaking as a priority for the church. 
It recognized the structural disorders of the world, 
which left 1.2 billion people near starvation and 
wasted its treasure in the arms stampede. It decried 
the 450 billion dollar world expenditure for arms 
and called for new thinking to replace the old reli-
ance on national interest, security, and power in a 
more interrelated world. It estimated that one-third 
of that armament cost was born by the United 
States. The statement was important as it chal-
lenged individuals and the church to respond, 
change, and create an institution within the church 
dedicated to peacemaking. Significant votes in 
local congregations chose to support the program 
and the offering, and maybe one-third of approxi-
mately 11,000 congregations chose to support the 
new effort. The language of kairos was used three 
times in the document to assert that this was the 
time for the church to act decisively with new 
thinking, new budget, and new actions. 
 The nation, however, thought otherwise, enter-
ing into a period of arms build-up and assertive 
militancy under the Reagan administration. Chief 
of Army Chaplains, a Presbyterian, resigned in 
fear that the new military was planning to fight a 
nuclear war rather than merely adequately to deter 
one. The Church officially considered a policy of 
Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 37, 3, Summer 2011 6 
resistance to the increasing militarism, but by 
1988, it concluded to work against the militarism 
with renewed use of ordinary means—meaning 
witness and politics—rather than to engage as a 
church officially in resistance. Still individual 
members were to be supported in their acts of re-
sistance. Gradually the sole super-power role of 
the U.S. turned into more arms exports, less for-
eign aid, sporadic attempts to relieve world suffer-
ing and, after 9/11, more wars. The Peacemaking 
Program declined more rapidly than the overall 
church and while it presently exists, it remains 
anemic. The most recent General Assembly of 
2010 called for a review of the program and its 
foundation in Peacemaking: the Believer’s Call-
ing. In retrospect, although kairos was an impor-
tant concept in the Church policy, the Church 
probably misjudged 1980 as a time of peacemak-
ing significance since the country went the other 
way. The writing of the task force, though adopted 
by General Assembly, was not shared by the 
Church as a whole. Polls showed that the majority 
of Presbyterians voted Republican. Tillich’s relig-
ious socialism was ignored and the Presbyterian 
Church advocated religious welfare-capitalism. 
 
South Africa Kairos 
 
Kairos is more central in the Kairos Document of 
South Africa than it was in the Presbyterian docu-
ment. In the 1986 edition, it is defined as “Kairos 
is the Greek word that is used in the Bible to des-
ignate a special moment of time when God visits 
his people to offer them a unique opportunity for 
repentance and conversion for change and decisive 
action.”4 The nation was in crisis and many were 
being killed in the movement to end apartheid. 
The document was drafted in a theological center, 
referred to many groups for amendment, pub-
lished, criticized, and then in 1986, republished in 
a second edition. It recognized the divisions in the 
country and within the church. It criticized the 
theologies of state and church then dominant in the 
country and called for a prophetic theology that 
was very specific as to the social diagnosis of 
apartheid and then offered methods for Christian 
action against apartheid. Arguing that God sides 
with the oppressed and wants to liberate the peo-
ple, the document called for participating in the 
struggle, transforming regular church activities 
into social change, the initiation of special cam-
paigns against the apartheid system in churches, 
activities of civil disobedience against a tyrannical 
government, and the provision of moral guidance, 
including counseling the liberators against those 
who would act “thoughtlessly and wildly.” 
 The prophetic theology was articulated in 
terms of classical reformed arguments against tyr-
anny. A government that acts against the common 
good that it is to serve is no government and needs 
to be replaced with a just government. The docu-
ment recognized that the majority of Christians in 
the country were oppressed by the present apart-
heid ideology and the government, and had al-
ready chosen to replace it. It set itself against the 
theology of both the apartheid ideology and the 
temporizing opposition to apartheid of the English 
churches. In this case, church participation in the 
struggle deepened and within five years change 
came to South Africa, and the theological contri-
bution in this predominantly Christian nation was 
recognized. The document also helped Christians 
abroad think through the situation in South Africa 
and assist in supporting the struggle through di-
vestment activities, boycotts, and civil disobedi-
ence. 
 
Kairos Central America  
  
The Kairos Central American document of 1988 
evolved through a process in which hundreds were 
involved in the midst of civil wars. It was a time of 
the height of liberation theology and the document 
expressed many of its themes. The sensitive reader 
picks up more Marxist themes than in the South 
African one and, to that degree, it is closer to the 
language of Tillich’s circle than its predecessor.  
The American empire is the enemy that allies 
with the church and the establishment to keep the 
poor in their exploited position. Jesus, the proph-
ets, and Mary who identify with the suffering of 
the poor are called into service as enemies of the 
empire. God’s Kingdom, a utopia, is to be built on 
earth by the exploited masses of Central America, 
and the process is seen in the success of the Sand-
inista movement in Nicaragua. The exploitation 
began with the Spanish conquest, and resistance 
against it has occurred for 500 years, but now, in 
the present, opposition to the evil of the establish-
ment is rising and can succeed in restoring peace 
and justice to Central America. Readers of the 
document are asked to take sides in the struggle 
with the poor to overthrow the rulers. The hour is 
seen as decisive by the writers. More than 200,000 
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had been killed in the previous ten years of strug-
gle and the writers believed history was coming to 
a climax. “This historic hour in Central America is 
a Kairos, the passing of God incarnate in Jesus, 
through the burning waste of Central America, 
calling us to fight for the Kingdom, to the cross, to 
unwavering hope, to invincible unity, to resurrec-
tion triumph.”5 
 The appeals of the theologians assisting in the 
revolutions were heard abroad during the cold war. 
In a peacemaking presentation in the University of 
Berlin, I met theologians who were studying Span-
ish to better grasp liberation theology and who 
proudly presented me with Nicaraguan coffee in 
1983. But when I asked Bernard Häring in the 
Vatican how many were studying liberation theol-
ogy there, he replied two, one of my students and 
myself! The Vatican with its campaign to free Po-
land was not about to support any leftist revolution 
against the United States in Central America. The 
Reagan Administration, acting for the United 
States, thought it was fighting the cold war there 
and not that it was aligning against a genuine, long 
standing revolution of the poor. The document 
dismisses this overreaction from the United States, 
but it was real and to a degree as determinative, as 
the opposition of the Catholic Church or the Latin 
American establishment. My own visits to Central 
and South America out of sympathy with the revo-
lutionaries and the liberation theologians in 1990 
led me to believe the fall of the USSR had nega-
tive consequences for the liberation movements in 
Latin America. As the Vatican encouraged the 
hardening of the hierarchy against liberation the-
ology, the local authorities often responded to dis-
credit the movement. Even within Peru, Father 
Gustavo Gutierrez’s movements were limited. I 
agree the revolutionaries found a moment of per-
sonal and communal kairos, but the progressives 
were up against fierce opposition, which they 
named as anti-kingdom forces. For the most part 
the establishment won the battles leaving a pro-
gressive remnant to work in more modest ways to 
hope for the future, but the radical change was 
defeated and murdered. Before the fall of the So-
viet Union, decision makers in the U.S. were 
pushed to extreme measures. Congress tried to 
shut down support for overthrowing the Sandinista 
government. President Regan and his cohorts at-
tempted to supply the Contras through the Iran-
Contra deal, thereby discrediting their foreign pol-
icy and proving several of them guilty of illegal 
acts. The denial of the humanity of the poor con-
tinued. The resultant migration continues to 
threaten Republicans in the United States where 
the latest census records 50 million Hispanics, 
many of whom are refugees from those wars and 
poverty. My colleague, Gonzalo Castillo-
Cardenas, and I toured Latin American Liberation 
projects in 1990 from Nicaragua to Chile. Re-
cently, in reflecting on the Central American expe-
rience, he suggested: “Our hopes for change were 
too high.” There has been little improvement in 
the condition of the poor.6 
 While Robert MacAfee Brown sees similari-
ties to the Barmen Declaration in these theologies, 
I see more cultural analysis characteristic of Til-
lich. The analysis is more of the church than Til-
lich’s use of kairos, and the church is called to 
action in a way that Tillich could only have hoped 
for. However, the wider and more dramatic social 
critique is much more characteristic of Tillich than 
of Barth. The Barmen Declaration, for all of its 
power is mostly confined to the argument for the 
freedom of the church to follow only Christ.7 
Brown began his story of kairos with Tillich’s use 
of kairos, and then in an ending, he challenged the 
North American churches included the Barmen 
Declaration in the book. 
 
Kairos and Church Struggle: Two Documents 
  
Two church documents written in the last score of 
years take the struggle straight to the church while 
not neglecting the social and historical context. 
The Road to Damascus: Kairos and Conversion 
was published deliberately on the tenth anniver-
sary of the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, July 
19, 1989. It represented, according to the docu-
ment, the reflections of hundreds of people in Af-
rica, Central America, and Asia. It is framed in 
terms of liberation theology and thousands of per-
sons indicated by signing the document that it re-
flected their will. It focused on the conflict be-
tween the left wing and the right wing within the 
Christian community. This conflict, resulting in 
oppression and murder, is the kairos of which the 
document speaks. The theme of Paul’s conversion 
from a persecutor to an apostle on the Damascus 
Road carries the proclamation on into the conflict 
within the communities of the church. The 
Church’s absorption into the Empire is regarded as 
apostasy leading to idolatry, and right-wing Chris-
tianity is denounced as heretical. 
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 We have wished to make it quite clear that 
those Christians who side with the imperialists, the 
oppressors and the exploiters of people, are siding 
with idolaters who worship power, money, privi-
lege and pleasure.8 
 Kairos Europa flowed from the Ecumenical 
Assembly of European Churches in Basel in 1989. 
It is a movement interpreted as attempting to gath-
er the churches into a Status Confessionis against 
neo-liberal economics and its consequences. Ul-
rich Duchrow models his remarks after the 
Barmen Confession and treats neo-liberal eco-
nomic practice in national economies, the World 
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund as 
similar to Nazism and apartheid of the 20th cen-
tury, even though its consequences of death and 
exclusion are more indirect. 
 The churches are called to redirect their in-
vestments and property to serve ecological and 
social welfare causes and away from banks and 
other institutions supporting capitalist globaliza-
tion. A socially responsible economy is sought 
which practices ecological responsibility. The 
movement calls for combating speculation, struc-
tural adjustment policies, lower taxes for the 
wealthy, the 1979 monetary policy, and privatiza-
tion. The World Alliance of Reformed Churches, 
in its organization, has developed many studies 
around Confession and economics, and finds the 
means of confession palatable to many of its lead-
ers. Resistance to the trend is high among Re-
formed Christians in the U.S., placing more trust 
in the market mechanisms of the economy and its 
host of international institutions. The Kairos Eu-
ropa tends toward the sharpness of The Road to 
Damascus document but with more of an empha-
sis upon economic theory. Earlier attempts to 
move toward a Status Confessionis against recent 
neo-liberal economic trends have been led by 
Czech theologians more sympathetic to socialism 
than the Reformed populations of the United 
States. Tillich’s Kairos Circle concentrated less 
upon international economics, but the economic 
directions of that circle are distantly echoed in this 
form of Kairos document. The author admits to 
less direct involvement with these two documents 
than the previous three and turns now toward the 
Kairos Palestine document “A Moment of Truth.” 
The publication of the document and conversa-
tions with two of the authors inspired this paper. 
 
 
Palestinian Kairos   
  
The 2009 call to faith and action by the writers of 
Kairos Palestine honors the model of the South 
African document, and it hopes to contribute to the 
liberation of Palestine. My visitations and study of 
Palestine since 1980 contribute to my support of 
their reading of the facts on the ground. They are 
occupied, subjected to apartheid like oppression, 
humiliated, and impoverished. Like the North 
American Native Americans, their land has been 
taken, their homes and crops destroyed, and they 
have been confined to reserves where they are de-
pendent upon the welfare of others for their sur-
vival. The writers of the document do not see signs 
of immediate or near-time relief. They fear they 
may be close to losing hope for their own state 
despite the world’s clamor that their rights be rec-
ognized. For them the kairos is a moment to 
speak, to tell the truth, and as they say: “Kairos is 
the moment when we see God’s gifts in the midst 
of our suffering.” 
 The document is less on economics than on 
political theology. It lacks the socialist tendencies 
of the previous three documents; rather it is asking 
for the use of capitalist or mixed-economic means 
of boycott, divestment, and sanctions to dislodge 
Israel from its occupation. To this extent, it is 
quite different from the political-economic theol-
ogy of the original Kairos Circle, yet it focuses on 
time.  
 As Tillich, later as a supporter of Zionism, 
shifted from the “Time” interpretation for Israel to 
the “Space and Time” interpretation, this docu-
ment is pushing for a Space-Time perspective. 
Jerusalem or Al-Qids is central to the document, 
and it is claimed as the future capitol of Palestine. 
I read a paper on the pro-Zionism of Paul Tillich 
and Reinhold Niebuhr to a Christian audience in-
cluding Arab scholars at Tantur between Jerusa-
lem and Bethlehem in 1980. As the 2009 Christian 
document asserts, their perspective is that the sins 
of Europe should not have been repented at the 
expense of the Arabs, as I was informed at that 
time. The issue is the land, and as an old Sioux 
chief in Iowa said before he was murdered: “The 
white man wants all of the land.” To the Palestin-
ian farmers, shepherds, and olive grove workers I 
have visited, that is the issue here. In the United 
Nations, only the United States of America sup-
ports Israel’s daily expansion of its control of the 
land and water of Palestine. 
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 Beyond the facts of Israel’s occupation and 
expansion on the ground, the document moves to 
its theology. It presents a Palestinian interpretation 
of faith, hope, and love as its foundations. Biblical 
criticism is accepted and fundamentalism rejected. 
While theological themes are discussed, the idea 
that political policy could be read directly out of 
scripture is rejected. The Bible must be interpreted 
in a living way, and in accordance with the rejec-
tion of repression, slavery, and the domination of 
one people over another at their expense. The doc-
ument seems to me to be less utopian than some of 
the predecessor documents, and, if in their 
enthusiasm for political change they slipped into 
romanticism, this document avoids those illusions. 
It is most Tillichian in its use of love, power, and 
justice, though it does not use Tillich’s ontology at 
this point. Its one is that of the mature Christian 
realist Tillich who is demanding political change, 
perhaps in a tone like his denunciation of Hitler in 
1933 or Senator Goldwater in 1964. It is most un-
like Tillich in its rejection of Zionism and avoid-
ance of socialist terminology. 
 The occupation is denounced as sin. Resis-
tance to oppression is to be carried out under the 
ethic of love. Such an ethic based in an under-
standing of Jesus must reject fighting evil with 
evil, but hue to non-violent resistance. The history 
of resistance includes trying to defend their land 
through Israel’s courts. Political petitions are reis-
sued while being beaten and rebuilding their 
homes. I have eaten in homes destroyed by Israel 
four times, and in tents removed regularly and re-
established. To hold onto their land, they have 
built dwellings in caves when home-rebuilding is 
forbidden. Their resistance includes civil disobedi-
ence, and I have joined with other Christians, Jews 
and Muslim demonstrators in actions both toler-
ated and repressed by Israel. Resistance has in-
cluded violence as a response to violence, but the 
writers and signers of the document reject the evil 
of violence and call for non-violent suffering. 
Their major call for solidarity from the world 
churches is a request that they come on pilgrimage 
to Palestine and they pledge to show them the real-
ity of Palestine while they pray with them. Sabeel, 
the ecumenical liberation theology center in Jeru-
salem, has developed its own liturgies for such 
pilgrimages, but adjusts its use of its rather politi-
cal liturgy to the needs of visiting groups. They 
also ask churches to join with the Palestinian 
Christians in supporting boycotts, divestment, and 
sanctions against the occupation. 
 While rejecting the concepts of religiously 
based states, they pledge to work with their ene-
mies and allies to build states for all that are based 
in justice and civil liberties. Within Sabeel, which 
is involved in the document, and often blamed for 
it, the debate between their policy of two states 
and a one state solution continues. While there are 
articulate Palestinian voices for the one state solu-
tion, as Israel’s aggression with U.S. support 
seems invincible, this would be a reluctant recog-
nition of reality. The preferred outcome would be 
two states with Jerusalem divided or international-
ized, refugees repatriated or compensated, and the 
1967 boundaries restored. The language of recon-
ciliation and forgiveness in the document seems 
consistent with the characters of the writers I know 
listed on the document.  
 The document, though prophetic in its denun-
ciations and strategies, has been endorsed by the 
heads of many of the churches in Palestine and for 
study by North American churches. It is part of the 
struggle within North American Protestantism to 
begin the divestment from American corporations 
that support the occupation that is against interna-
tional law. Israel and Jewish denunciations of the 
Kairos Palestine are frequent, and they are avail-
able on the internet with entries under Kairos. 
Similarly Protestant churches in the United States 
are subjected to heavy Jewish lobbying when they 
consider divesting from selected firms that refuse 
to withdraw their support from the occupation. 
Though the Presbyterian General Assembly called 
for the study of the document and partially en-
dorsed it, some local Presbyteries, afraid of Jewish 
pressure, avoid studying it. These debates and in-
terventions are reminiscent of the divestment de-
bates around apartheid in South Africa. I am not 
certain of which stage of the debate they represent. 
The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) finally divested 
from firms involved in supporting apartheid in 
South Africa, but I received anti-divestment litera-
ture, particularly from the Wall Street Journal, 
from the President of the Seminary at which I 
taught until Nelson Mandela became president and 
apartheid was abolished. At present, many in that 
same economically conservative denomination 
including financial leaders regard divestment as a 
last resort rather than as a normal, useful tool of 
non-violent social change from massive evil to-
ward justice. The denomination officially and 
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practically supports the state of Israel and is com-
mitted to its protection; it has not yet found an ef-
fective way to support the rights of the Arab 
(Christian and non-Christian) populations suffer-
ing under that country’s occupation. In this, its 
response differs little from the official policies of 
the United States. To refer to the distinctions of 
the South African document of state, church, and 
prophetic theologies, my denomination is still 
caught in church theology with only echoes of 
prophetic theology. In its mildness, it covertly 
supports the state ideology, although, while unable 
to divest its own funds, it has called for the ending 
of U.S. foreign aid to Israel’s military. 
 In conclusion: Tillich was correct in his Sys-
tematic Theology that the kairos theology has its 
own life. Political, economic, theological, and 
ideological elements are all involved in social 
change as are non-violent and violent means of 
change. The Palestinian document inspired these 
reflections, but as it recognized, its time is not 
immediate, and it differs from the more socialist 
documents in being less involved in economic 
analysis. On the other hand, the kairos as eternal 
meaning intersecting the present is certainly evi-
dent in the Arab speaking world, and Palestine 
may not be immune in ways not previously per-
ceived by the authors of the Palestinian document. 
Religion and socialism are reconciled in many 
places and Tillich’s early theology is relevant, but 
it must remember that it was pre-New Deal. New 
developments of it may become relevant under 
social-welfare and mixed-market economies. 
Likewise, The Road to Damascus: Kairos and 
Conversion and Kairos Europa are realized more 
as critical utopias than as immediate actionable 
historical projects. Kairos Central America was 
defeated by state and church, but the poverty and 
suffering of Latin America still cry out for revolu-
tionary change. The American Presbyterian dream 
of countering American militarism has been ec-
lipsed by militarism and economic interests, and 
the kairos they perceived has been buried under 
church bureaucratization and national security 
concerns. The South African Karios Document has 
approached the closest to fulfillment. Tillich saw 
his vision in the twenties as relevant to small 
groups, but it has grown to where it calls forth 
church responses and sometimes these come close 
to realization. When our movements fail or nearly 
fail, those still nurturing aspects of Tillich’s vision 
are saved from cynicism by the same Spirit that 
prompted them in the first place. 
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Updating Tillich on Religion  
and Art 
 
David Nikkel 
 
aul Tillich wrote much about art and religious 
symbolism and experience. As I have argued 
elsewhere, despite the diversity of these writings, 
one can discern a positing of three basic artistic 
styles: idealism, naturalism, and expressionism—
the latter divided into a negative variety, where 
subject matter and forms are broken apart and 
judged, and a positive variety, where the ordinary 
is bent but form and surface content are in some 
way affirmed. While idealistic or naturalistic art 
can become the occasion for experiencing the di-
vine according to Tillich, they are also quite liable 
to convey a “self-sufficient finitude” that obscures 
the depth dimension. Expressionism by contrast 
stands as the style most conducive to an inbreak-
ing of the divine. Tillich reacted favorably to a 
P 
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European movement of the 1930s known as the 
new objectivity or realism, also labeled “belief-ful 
realism” by Tillich, which came on the heels of 
Expressionism in the narrow sense of the early 
twentieth-century movement. However, Tillich 
found strong expressionistic stylistic elements in 
the new realism, positioning it far from any self-
sufficient realism. Tillich first thought—or 
hoped—that this new realism might constitute a 
positive expressionism, theonomously affirming 
its own form and surface content (1929:65ff; 
1956:57ff). However, he concluded that, like Ex-
pressionism before it, it merely succeeded in a 
negative expressionism of judgment on contempo-
rary culture (1987:99, 124, 152, 169-70). Tillich’s 
fondest hope was that one day Western culture 
would attain again a theonomous culture—a cul-
ture where positive expressionist art could affirm 
symbols of ordinary reality as well as of expressly 
religious reality, bending them to allow the divine 
to break through, instead of a culture that permit-
ted such a divine inbreaking only through their 
destruction in negative expressionist art. 
Tillich wrote relatively little about art that fol-
lowed Expressionism and the new realism, that is, 
the art of the mid-twentieth century. “Religious 
Dimensions of Contemporary Art,” probably Til-
lich’s last lecture on art, represents an exception. 
In this piece, he notes a general movement away 
from expressionism—“a revolt against the disrup-
tion of the surface reality”—to a new naturalism 
that “attend(s) to the conventional aspects of ex-
perience” (1987:180). In particular Tillich cites 
figural painting, pop art, and op art. Nevertheless, 
Tillich continues, these three movements bear 
strong expressive elements; we cannot return to 
older representational painting. (Here one can dis-
cern a certain similarity of these latter movements 
to the new realism.) Tillich acknowledges it is too 
early to make any considered judgments about 
such art.  
Furthermore, in the article mentioned above, I 
broach an additional stylistic category pertaining 
to relations between the finite and the infinite in 
art. Naturalism and idealism (unless comple-
mented by some expressionism) default to self-
sufficient finite content that neglects the infinite; 
with expressionism, by contrast, finite content re-
veals infinite depth. If we exhaust the abstract 
logical possibilities, we have the following stylis-
tic type: infinite depth that attempts to eliminate 
finite content (as much as possible). I add the par-
enthetical remark because visual art by its very 
nature involves an indispensable finite medium. In 
fact Tillich, in “Art and Ultimate Reality” (origi-
nally published in 1960), once explicitly refers to 
such an arguably counter-intuitive style, designat-
ing it as a “mystical” artistic style (1987:145ff).  
He here analogizes this style to “the mystical 
type” of religion, which “tries to reach ultimate 
reality without the mediation of particular things” 
(145). He then proceeds to analyze several works 
of art that manifest such a mystical style. 
Having provided a background on religion and 
artistic styles, I propose to do a Tillichian critique 
of key artists and movements primarily from the 
middle of the twentieth century. “Religious Di-
mensions” includes a brief history of modern 
Western art before coming to the three above-
mentioned “contemporary” movements. This his-
tory concludes with a representative of abstract 
expressionism (Hans Hofmann’s Magenta and 
Blue) and with examples of Piet Mondrian’s ab-
stractionism. Since I regard some examples and 
exemplars of abstract art as exhibiting a minimal-
ism consonant with the “mystical style” that Til-
lich identified in “Art and Ultimate Reality,” I 
will draw on both these articles to assess abstrac-
tionism and abstract expressionism. As I take on 
this task of appraisal, I will be willing to analyze 
some of Tillich’s own evaluations as inconsistent 
with his best insights on artistic style. Finally, I 
will not assume, with Tillich, that art can become 
the occasion for an immediate awareness of the 
divine beyond the subject-object scheme. Nor will 
I assume with Tillich that an individual artist must 
have an ultimate concern—informed by his or her 
society’s ultimate concern—that must find ex-
pression in every cultural creation. The plausibil-
ity of this second Tillichian assumption is not 
only undermined by the possibility that some art 
is just concerned with mundane beauty and/or 
practicality, but also by the irony of some forms 
of postmodernism.1 Nevertheless, I will assume 
that art can powerfully symbolize the divine and, 
with Tillich, that certain styles are more condu-
cive to such symbolism than others.  
I will first consider two of the three move-
ments that represent for Tillich a relative return to 
naturalism and representation. Tillich offers just 
one example from “figural art,” Willem de Koon-
ing’s Woman I. Tillich rightly sees in it “stylistic 
elements of the expressionists” (1987:180; see 
also1987: 169). This work distorts and exagger-
ates features of the female face and body. Further 
Tillich finds “an absolute rejection of any attempt 
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to return to the idealistic or naturalistic styles be-
fore Expressionism” (1987:180). In fact, many 
works of Expressionism proper were centered on 
the human face and figure. In particular, I felt a 
sense of sadness expressed in this woman’s face 
similar to the respective faces in Rouault’s Head 
of Christ and Clown. Indeed, one might judge that 
an expressionistic style dominates in Woman I. 
Thus, the naturalistic elements of this painting and 
similar works appear to gain their salience from 
being part of a wider trend of increased represen-
tation, rather than from within the paintings them-
selves. 
This brings us to the next movement, pop-art. 
Tillich notes that many pop-art paintings are col-
lages or collage-like. In this vein, he cites Lich-
tenstein’s Engagement Ring, Wesselman’s Still 
Life, Johns’s Out the Window, and Oldenburg’s 
Interior (Installation, Green Gallery, New York, 
1962). He claims that this type of artwork 
attempts to depict “banal reality,” yet with expres-
sionistic and surrealistic elements (1987:180-81). 
I do find these latter elements in Wesselman, 
Johns, and Oldenburg. Wesselman’s Still Life and 
Great American Nude series make use of colors, 
often deep or bright, in shades and combinations 
we do not find in actual settings and situations, 
reminiscent of some post-Impressionists and Ex-
pressionists. Tillich refers to Still Life as “repul-
sive” (1987: 181); I see a parallel to the glaring or 
oppressive colors in some of Van Gogh’s works, 
for example. When each piece is viewed as a 
whole, Johns’s collage pieces—often with colors 
overlaid with letters of the associated color-
word—strike me as quite abstract expressionistic. 
They lie somewhere between the static colors of a 
Rothko and the swirling activity of a Pollock. 
Oldenburg certainly manifests a surrealistic qual-
ity in depicting certain objects as similar to quite 
different objects, while Wesselman sometimes 
achieves the same through unusual juxtapositions 
of objects with parts of the female body.  
In keeping with his general unwillingness to 
make judgments about the three movements, Til-
lich leaves to the future the question of whether 
such pop-art contains “something creative, origi-
nal and brilliantly new” (1987: 181). To the extent 
these three artists portrayed everyday objects, one 
might conclude that the surface object is affirmed 
but distorted enough to allow a depth dimension 
to break through—at least in some of their paint-
ings. Yet I have to conclude that their works yield 
more of a negative than a positive expressionism. 
In the case of Wesselman, I sense recourse to 
elemental forms, which Tillich found in Cezanne 
and in cubism. That is, the elements of Wessel-
man’s collages tend to be basic shapes in basic 
colors. Tillich opined that a return to elemental 
forms stemmed from the inability to affirm our 
present cultural reality (1987: 94-95, 168). In cub-
ism, a negative expressionism clearly reigns, with 
its destruction of ordinary forms of reality. 
Granted, it is not quite the same with Wesselman. 
One could argue that his paintings affirm the indi-
vidual objects of his collage-like scenes. How-
ever, there is no affirmation of the reality of the 
scene as whole, of our contemporary reality holis-
tically. Finally, I find Lichtenstein’s comic-strip 
figures, which Tillich labels as “all surface” and 
showing “the most vulgar daily reality,” to accept 
complacently banal, surface reality. In this I dis-
agree with Tillich, who judged the Engagement 
Ring as “in some sense” “still expressionistic” 
(1987: 181).  
My judgment regarding Lichtenstein segues 
into my consideration of the man who became the 
most famous of the pop-artists, Andy Warwhol. I 
do not know if Tillich’s neglect of Warhol 
stemmed from lack of acquaintance or from a 
negative impression of his work. Warhol repre-
sents an interesting case vis-à-vis religion. Raised 
Byzantine Rite Catholic, he continued to attend 
Mass almost daily, though never taking Commun-
ion (Dillenberger, 16–17). This may reveal some-
thing of a spectator attitude.2 When he himself 
was shot in an assassination attempt, he reflected: 
Before I was shot, I always thought that I was 
more half-there than all-there—I always sus-
pected that I was watching TV instead of liv-
ing life. People sometimes say that the way 
things happen in movies is unreal, but actually 
it’s the way things happen in life that’s unreal. 
The movies make emotions look so strong and 
real, whereas when things really do happen to 
you, it’s like watching television—you don’t 
feel anything. Right when I was being shot 
and ever since, I knew that I was watching 
television. The channels switch, but it’s all 
television (Warhol 345).  
Critics divide on whether his paintings of con-
sumer products and celebrities serve as a critique 
of, or a paean to, American commercial culture—
though most cast their vote for the latter. One can 
readily identify a naturalism in such works, in that 
they render rather accurate, recognizable images 
of the products or celebrities. Also, one can read 
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an idealism into or from the larger-than-life size 
of these objects or subjects. Harder to detect in 
these works is anything that would constitute a 
critique of American mass culture. The pieces of 
art themselves do not appear to express negativity 
either in the way a critical realism would pass 
judgment on society or through a destruction of 
content and forms a la negative expressionism. 
 Before concluding my coverage of Warhol, I 
want to address another portion of his oeuvre, a 
part holding religious ramifications, even if nega-
tive ones: the Death and Disaster Series (Satur-
day Disaster, for example). Warhol once con-
fessed, “I never understood why when you died, 
you didn’t just vanish and everything could just 
keep going the way it was, only you just wouldn’t 
be there” (web). To me this suggests a flattening 
of the reality of death and life. And that is what 
Warhol’s reproduction of headlines and images 
related to deadly disasters or tragedies conveys to 
me. One could instead argue that Warhol was at-
tempting to wake us up to the reality of that to 
which mass media had inured us. Yet his repro-
duction of headlines and photographs and his 
repetition of images such as the late Marilyn Mo-
nroe and the grieving Jackie Kennedy, usually 
with unobtrusive secondary colors in the back-
ground, suggest the banality and even meaning-
lessness of death. 
 No doubt, Andy Warhol enjoyed consuming 
Campbell’s soup and Coca-Cola (and I share his 
taste, at least on the former). One can conceivably 
interpret him as attempting to sacralize, to express 
the ultimate significance of, everyday mass cul-
ture (see Romaine). And I will grant that he may 
well have harbored the hope of finding something 
sacred or ultimate in the products and celebrities 
he captured. Unfortunately, however, I have to 
conclude that instead he ended up conveying an-
other aspect of himself and his worldview: the 
flatness, disconnectedness, and fleetingness of 
surface reality. In its own way, his oeuvre paints a 
self-sufficient finitude by failing to point to any-
thing deeper. Rather than the thickness and depth 
of the interconnectedness of reality in space and 
time, we get the fad of the moment with its “fif-
teen minutes” of ultimately empty fame. Rather 
than a sense of the continuing influence of the de-
ceased on persons and their environments in the 
present, the departed’s significance vanishes. In 
this Warhol’s art accords with some forms of sub-
sequent radical or deconstructionist postmodern-
ism. Thus, the secular contents of Warhol’s work 
lack expressive affirmation of anything of deep 
value. 
 As something of an epilogue to Warhol, I will 
touch on his late religious paintings, in particular 
the Last Supper series. Though inspired by da 
Vinci’s famous piece, I find his images of Christ 
and surroundings bland and banal, lacking any 
interesting expressiveness. Warhol’s religious im-
ages fail in conveying judgment on human sin, 
whereas some negative Expressionist efforts suc-
ceeded. Some members of this series point to the 
saving power of Christ’s suffering as foreshad-
owed in the meal, and some foreshadow Christ’s 
resurrection—for example, the one with the Gen-
eral Electric and Dove Soap logos. Yet these fall 
under Tillich’s negative judgment concerning re-
ligious art that attempts to affirm positive relig-
ious content, art depicting “symbols of glory.” 
According to Tillich, such symbols have failed to 
achieve their intended effect (1987: 124; see also, 
1987: 69, 170). 
 Before directly considering modern abstract or 
non-objective art, I will say more about the above-
mentioned “mystical style” that attempts to mini-
mize finite content, to minimize “the mediation of 
particular things” (1987:145-46). General and 
specific examples of such a mystical style cited by 
Tillich include: (1) “Chinese landscapes in which 
air and water symbolize the cosmic unity, and in-
dividual rocks or branches hardly dare emerge to 
an independent existence”; in particular, Ashi-
kage’s The Landscape and works by Tai Chin; (2) 
some Impressionist paintings with their “dissolu-
tion of particulars into a continuum of light and 
colors,” specifically Seurat’s Fishing Fleet; (3) 
“(m)ost radically,” “non-objective painting,” for 
which Tillich invokes Klee’s Equals Infinity, 
Kandinsky’s Improvisation, and Pollock’s Num-
ber 1A, 1948 (1987: 146-47). Tillich has more to 
say in assessing such abstract art; however, I will 
save Tillich’s comments to intersperse with my 
own Tillichian assessment of non-objective art. 
 Given its expressionistic intentions, abstract 
expressionism would seem to be the presumptive 
candidate for a non-objective art conducive to ex-
pressing religious depth. But I will first consider 
earlier “radical abstractionist” art touched upon by 
Tillich, in particular as represented through works 
by Mondrian (1987: 180) and Kandinsky (1987: 
146-47). Both artists moved more or less from 
representational painting to pure abstraction. In-
terestingly, Tillich warned about the following 
danger with non-objective art: “The spatial empti-
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ness of some pictures indicates merely artistic 
emptiness. The attempt to express ultimate reality 
by annihilating reality can lead to works in which 
nothing at all is expressed” (1987: 146). I do find 
Mondrian’s later oeuvre featuring sharply defined 
lines, colors, and rectangular shapes to be cold 
and empty (for example, New York City I). In con-
trast I generally find Kandinsky’s abstractions to 
be interesting—but to express “nothing at all” of 
ultimate reality. The interesting configurations of 
colors, shapes, and patterns leave me strictly in 
finite reality. Some of Kandinsky’s Improvisation 
series represent a possible exception to this judg-
ment. In mentioning one particular Improvisation, 
unfortunately Tillich does not specify the number. 
I do find Improvisation 7 to be quite different 
from many of Kandinsky’s abstract works. In con-
trast to the sharp delineations of many of the oth-
ers, Improvisation 7 uses rounded, blurring lines 
with greens and browns, yielding a harmonious 
effect.3 While it does not quite succeed in convey-
ing the divine for me, it might for some. Tillich 
indicates that the viewing of a Kandinsky, “simi-
lar to” whichever one he was referring to in “Art 
and Ultimate Reality,” constituted “a liberation 
for me to be freed from the individual things and 
to be in a realm which at that time was very near 
to my own religious thinking” (1987: 146-47).  
 As I begin to tackle abstract expressionism, I 
will invoke another angle of Tillich’s thought 
concerning a possible “mystical style.” In “Art 
and Ultimate Reality,” he indicates that we find a 
mystical style “in the background of Asiatic and 
Western paintings, even if the foreground is filled 
with figures” (1987: 146). Earlier he refers to gold 
as “the transcendent color” and notes how the 
gold background of Byzantine and medieval art in 
general and that of the baptistery of Ravenna, in 
particular, can “mediate the feeling of transcen-
dent blessedness.” In keeping with his later mus-
ings on a mystical style, he adds that “there is no 
special object which is beautified” on the baptis-
tery (1987:113). To the extent one’s focus is on 
the golden background, artistic minimalism would 
effectively reign. For me such a gold background 
would invite a time of meditation or contempla-
tive prayer where I kept my gaze trained upon it. 
This line of thought leads me to the Abstract Ex-
pressionism of Mark Rothko’s color-field painting 
or “color abstractionism.” Rothko’s use of few 
colors in each painting, their deep hues and dark 
luminousness, and the subtle variations within a 
particular color-field all strike me as highly con-
ducive to contemplation where one can get lost in 
a painting (for example, Green and Maroon). (In 
contrast, Barnett Newman’s one-color abstraction-
ist works evoke from me at most a glance and at 
worst a turning away from their garishness.) 
However, neither the Byzantine gold nor Rothko’s 
color abstractions will likely convey a divine 
depth dimension upon viewing of normal dura-
tion. As suggested, they conduce to extended pe-
riods of mediation or contemplation. Given serial-
ism’s use of basic geometrical shapes and rela-
tively few colors, one might ask about its suitabil-
ity to contemplative viewing. I judge that Albers’s 
art involves significant enough color contrast, as 
the geometric shapes differentiate themselves 
through the contrasting colors, such that one will 
probably not lose oneself in his works (for exam-
ple, Homage to the Square: Ascending). Rather, 
they constitute somewhat interesting geometric 
and color patterns which remain ensconced in the 
finite. (I would extend this judgment to the above-
mentioned Magenta and Blue by Hoffman.) While 
serialism’s raison d’etre points to a never-ending 
artistic process, the process is still a finite process, 
not reaching or attempting to reach an eternal di-
mension in Tillich’s sense. I will render a more 
positive judgment about the serialism of Frank 
Stella. While Sinjerli Variation IV utilizes a large 
variety of colors and hues, its circular shape and 
its complex integration of both colors and patterns 
yields a balance and a harmony that invite medita-
tive gazing. Indeed, I find it quite reminiscent of 
mandalas. 
As mentioned earlier, Tillich does identify one 
of Pollock’s pieces as an example of a mystical 
style (Number 1A, 1948). Apparently this refer-
ence to Pollock and the earlier-cited reference to 
Hans Hoffmann constitute his only preserved 
comments on abstract expressionists. The Dillen-
bergers attribute Tillich’s relative unfamiliarity 
with abstract expressionism to the slowness of 
museums to procure representative works from 
this movement (1987: xx). Tillich’s succinct as-
sessment of Pollock follows: “I must say I found 
it difficult to evaluate him, but since seeing some 
of his very best pictures at the Brussels Exhibi-
tion, I have become very much reconciled with 
this fullness of reality without a concrete subject 
matter” (1987: 147). Tillich’s categorization and 
evaluation of Pollock suggests that he believed 
such “mystical” non-objective art represented a 
likely candidate for conveying divine “fullness.” 
My preliminary expectation was that, like Tillich, 
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I would come to a positive assessment of Pollock 
in terms of expressing divine depths. Contrary to 
certain popular kneejerk reactions to Pollock’s art, 
one could never achieve his effects by throwing 
paint on a canvas. Scientific analysis of Pollock 
paintings has revealed the organization of highly 
complex dynamical systems (Taylor). Indeed, Pol-
lock’s works express a sense of highly complex 
movement. Thus, I do find his paintings interest-
ing. Yet, the relative lack of color contrast within 
his art results in a kind of minimalism in that par-
ticular dimension. For me, ultimately nothing of 
divine depth comes through. On the other hand, 
the complex movement evidenced in his works is 
not conducive to the meditative contemplation 
that some other abstract expressionist styles in-
vite.    
Tillich came to believe that non-objective art 
could expressively convey something of ultimate 
reality. Besides the above comment regarding Pol-
lock, he opined: “Of course, one cannot show ul-
timate reality directly, but one can use basic struc-
tural elements of reality like lines, cubes, planes, 
colors, as symbols for that which transcends all 
reality—and this is what the non-objective artists 
have done” (1987: 147). In such cases, one could 
say that, of the three elements Tillich stipulates in 
a work of art—form, content/substance (Inhalt), 
and style, content collapses into form. That is, 
there is no content from outside the work itself. 
Of course, I have shown myself to be much less 
sanguine than Tillich on whether non-objective, 
more or less minimalistic, art serves as a credible 
candidate to express the divine for most viewers. I 
have judged them to be too empty, such that 
“nothing at all is expressed” of ultimate reality, at 
least with viewing of normal duration. Yet even 
given his late openness to the divinely expressive 
possibilities of non-objective art, such art would 
seem to fall short of his ideal of a theonomous 
culture and art, wherein some identifiable object 
of a culture, whether religious or secular, is af-
firmed. As I have indicated elsewhere as well as 
earlier in this piece, Tillich concluded that con-
temporary art with explicit positive religious con-
tent failed in attempting to affirm both itself and 
the depth dimension. As seen above, Tillich was 
at one time hopeful that the new realism’s secular 
content could represent a positive expression-
ism—that is, that it could affirm the divine 
through its affirming something of our finite 
world. But he abandoned that hope. I would con-
clude that if we follow Tillichian principles to 
their likely dénouement, that the non-objective are 
Tillich analyzed can at best represent a negative 
expressionism—or alternatively in some cases 
conduce to prolonged meditative gazing. 
I will now nominate several paintings, un-
known to Tillich, as excellent candidates for a 
positive expressionism with secular content. 
American artist Charles E. Burchfield was a rep-
resentative both of “low art” through his wallpa-
per designing and of “high art” as a painter of 
scenes from American life and from nature. Some 
of his works strike me as examples of negative 
expressionism. Several of these, with nature as 
their subject, I find reminiscent of Van Gogh’s 
Starry Night in terms of shapes and lines (Orion 
in December, for example). Others, with Ameri-
can life, work, and technology as subject seem to 
presage the European new or belief-ful realism 
Tillich admired (for example, Black Iron). The 
color scheme of such examples of negative ex-
pressionism generally consists either of black, 
white, and gray or of dark colors with little con-
trast. Often enough they convey a sense of fore-
boding. On the other hand, the positive expres-
sionist paintings utilize curving lines and a subtle 
sense of color, with the colors yielding a harmo-
nious effect. Generally of nature, they do some-
times depict human artifact or construction as it 
blends with nature. Several hail from early in his 
career: Sunlight (1916), Late August Sunset 
(1916), and The Sun through the Trees (1917). 
Here already we can see Burchfield’s interest in 
light and shadow, yet unlike Impressionism, these 
works do not draw our attention to the finite sub-
ject and object. Four later paintings also draw 
upon curving lines and a subtle, harmonious color 
palette: Sultry Afternoon (1944), Song in the Rain 
(1947), Country Road in Spring (1947/1955), and 
Dream of a Flower (1960-1966). My favorite, 
however, comes from his middle period: In May 
(1939). This work conveys a profound sense of 
shadow and light. Additionally, it powerfully ex-
presses depth of field of vision through shapes, 
patterns, and colors more than through perspec-
tive.  
I will now attempt to expand upon a previ-
ously mentioned Tillichian insight: post-
Impressionism, most notably Cezanne, Expres-
sionism, and cubism worked to reduce reality to 
basic components, whether shapes and/or colors. 
The focus tended to be on the parts in contrast or 
separation because an integrated reality could not 
be affirmed. I believe Burchfield, in at least these 
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eight works I have highlighted, does succeed in 
bending the surface reality of instances of nature 
and of human culture, in a manner that affirms 
them as integrated realities, while expressing the 
divine source behind and within them. Thus, I 
deem him to have created works conducive to 
conveying the deep mystery and meaningfulness 
of human life and of nature. Recently, I ran across 
an art exhibit commentary consanguine with my 
evaluation: “In the 1940’s,” Burchfield “shifted to 
an expressionistic phase that saw a return to de-
pictions of nature, but the frightening, dark sub-
ject matter of his earlier work gave way to fantas-
tic or sublime content treated in a way that recog-
nizes and extols the divine in nature” (“Selections 
from the Nasher Museum of Art,” 13).4 Burchfield 
then may represent a postmodern positive expres-
sionist art transcending not only a superficial 
naturalism or idealism but a negative expression-
ism as well. 
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Specific paintings referenced can be located at the 
electronic database ARTstor (www.artstor.org), 
with the following exceptions: 
(1) Engagement Ring: The Roy Lichtenstein 
Foundation at: 
www.lichtensteinfoundation.org/engagering.org.ht
m 
(2) Roualt’s Head of Christ and Clown: Tillich, 
1987: plates 49 and 50, respectively (in black 
andwhite). 
(3) Kandinsky’s Improvisation No. 7: WebMu-
seum, Paris,  
www.ibiblio.org/wm/paint/auth/kandinsky. 
(4) I could not locate any image of Ashikage’s The 
Landscape. 
_________________________________ 
1 Russell Manning insightfully sees artistic presag-
ing of postmodern irony in the movements of figural, 
pop, and op art. Bouncing off of Manning’s insights, I 
would attribute Tillich’s difficulty in making even pre-
liminary judgments about this art to its difference from 
earlier art that took ultimate meaning—or the apparent 
absence of ultimate meaning—seriously (Manning 8-
11, 15-17). Tillich does ask, “Are we now in a period in 
which not only encountered reality has become unfa-
miliar to us, but in which even the concepts with which 
we have dealt with reality have become impossible? Is 
this new art an art of nonart?” And Tillich confesses 
that “(a) metaphysical dizziness grasps us” (1987:182). 
2 On the other hand, he volunteered at homeless 
shelters and financed a nephew’s education for the 
priesthood (Romaine).  
3 I have encountered four different works with 
“Improvisation No. 7” in or as the title—Kandinsky 
clearly not only numbered a series of Improvisations, 
but could do considerable “improvisations” within a 
given number! One is a woodcutting. Study for Im-
provisation No. 7 and Improvisation No. 7 (Storm) 
measure about the same size (roughly 2.3 by 1.6 feet), 
but with significant differences in coloration . The latter 
can be found at the Yale Art Gallery. The State Tretya-
kov Gallery, Moscow, holds the one to which I refer--
plain Improvisation No. 7 shall we call it? (measuring 
roughly 4.3 by 3.2 feet). The coloration I cite in my text 
comes from viewing the electronic image of the Web 
Museum, Paris. The image of ARTstor.org shows sig-
nificantly different coloration. 
4 However, in terms of chronology, the ten 
Burchfield paintings I analyze indicate that the 
return to nature began by at least 1939, while posi-
tive expressionistic depictions of nature occur in 
his early works and at least one “dark” negative 
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expressionist effort numbers among his later 
works (Orion in December).
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Delores Williams, who stands along with Ka-
tie Cannon and Jacquelyn Grant as the academic 
and spiritual godmothers of the influential woman-
ist theology movement, retired in 2004 as the sec-
ond scholar to hold the Paul Tillich Chair in The-
ology and Culture at Union Theological Seminary 
in the City of New York. Her predecessor was her 
own doktorvater, Tom Driver. When one reads 
Williams, especially her tour de force Sisters in 
the Wilderness, it is apparent that Williams has 
woven the tapestry of her constructive theology 
from the strands of the different theological tradi-
tions that inform her life, her worship, and her in-
tellect. Williams is a black woman living in the 
United States, raised amidst systemic racism in 
Louisville, Kentucky. She was a social activist and 
newspaper reporter during the most vibrant years 
of the Civil Rights movement, and her scholarship 
has uncovered the dimensions of faith and oppres-
sion experienced by black people throughout the 
history of the United States. In addition, Williams 
is a liberal, lay Presbyterian raised in an evangeli-
cal household, who has enjoyed a career as a stri-
dent ecumenist, and whose doctoral students have 
hailed comfortably from throughout the many 
mansions and nations of Protestant and Catholic 
Christendom. Finally, while Williams pursued her 
graduate work and learned amidst the neo-
orthodox, process, and black liberationist theo-
logical movements that dominated the times of her 
studies, she consistently has found fertile ground 
in the work of a theologian whose work is equally 
constructive to her own: Paul Tillich. Tillich’s leg-
acy continued from 1991 to 2004 at Union Theo-
logical Seminary due primarily to Williams’ tri-
umvirate courses on his theological corpus. In this 
article, I intend to discuss how the multifaceted 
theological work of Williams has been influenced 
by her familiarity with Tillich. This influence is 
shown especially through her admiration for his 
desire to construct a socially relevant theology, 
and the “courage to be” which defines his response 
to the trials and tribulations of individual and so-
cial human life. These themes underscore Wil-
liams’ constructive theology of culture that pro-
vided womanist theology with its authoritative, 
defining first forays into systematic theology. 
It is my privilege to have been the last of Wil-
liams’ doctoral students to defend his dissertation 
before her retirement from the faculty of Union. 
During those years, I explored the theology of Til-
lich with Williams through her courses, as her stu-
dent and her Tutor teaching assistant, via inde-
pendent studies conducted in her office, and 
amidst friendly conversation in the hospitality of 
her faculty apartment (which by the way, was Til-
lich’s residence before his departure for Harvard 
in 1955). One of the reasons that I was accepted 
for doctoral studies at Union was that Williams 
wanted to delve deeper into Tillich, and sought 
doctoral students whose interests reflected that 
orientation toward Tillich. As a result, in discuss-
ing the influence of Tillich on Williams, it will be 
necessary to draw upon our conversations, in addi-
tion to relying on the evidence found in Williams’ 
writings.  
In the summer of 2000, I said to Williams that 
I found it remarkable that so many liberationist 
theologians, whether writing out of black, femi-
nist, womanist, mujerista, Latin American, Afri-
can, or minjung (South Korea) contexts, found 
Tillich to be a valuable, reliable source for their 
constructive theology. This was interesting to me 
because on the surface, Tillich would seem to rep-
resent the masculine, white, socially and economi-
cally privileged, European-oriented theologian 
whose very contextuality would normally lend an 
aura of suspicion and unease to those regarding 
Tillich from a liberationist perspective. Rather 
than regarding Tillich with the sort of skepticism 
that often is accorded to Barth and Bultmann and 
their ilk, liberationists often embrace Tillich’s the-
ology as not only amicable, but surprisingly rele-
vant to their own theological ruminations.  
Williams’ response has stayed with me. She 
replied that many liberationists appreciate Tillich’s 
work because of the circumstances and choices of 
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his life. Williams maintained that Tillich had a 
personal understanding of alienation and exile, a 
comprehension that translated into his theological 
discernment of the human situation as defined by 
struggle with alienation from self, God, and world. 
Williams reminded me that as a young pastor, Til-
lich agonized profoundly as a chaplain to the 
German army in the First World War, suffering 
two nervous breakdowns during his years of serv-
ice, only to come home to find that his first wife 
was cheating on him with his best friend. She 
pointed out that when he was the dean of the phi-
losophy faculty at Frankfurt and expelled Nazi 
students who had attacked Jewish students, in con-
cert with writing his powerful The Socialist Deci-
sion, Tillich was the first non-Jewish professor to 
lose his professorship in Germany for his political 
stance. For fear of assassination, Tillich and his 
family were forced to flee to the United States, a 
country where his connections and background 
meant little to nothing, where he did not even 
know the language. Having initially to accept an 
academic position markedly inferior to his previ-
ous prestigious post at Frankfurt, Tillich had to 
rely upon the kindness of strangers to supply his 
salary and even his furnishings, both of which 
were donated by the permanent faculty at Union. It 
took Tillich seven years until he felt able to offer 
his first course in the English language, and out-
side of his friendly walks along Riverside Park 
with the German-fluent Reinhold Niebuhr, Tillich 
found his social community almost completely 
among fellow German exiles in New York City. 
Even once he began socializing with Columbia 
faculty and Manhattan socialites at exclusive 
clubs, Tillich favored the music and culture of 
nearby Harlem, thoroughly enjoying the flair and 
melancholy of jazz.  
This, this is the sort of white male, privileged 
European to whom liberationists could relate, said 
Williams. Tillich understood through his life expe-
rience what it meant to lose everything that 
brought meaning to his life, to have to navigate 
and negotiate an unfamiliar nation where adher-
ence to one’s culture and language brought only 
further alienation. Tillich is appealing to libera-
tionists, said Williams, precisely because he 
fought for the rights of those whom his society 
trampled, the Jews of Germany, and thereby suf-
fered the social, economic, and political conse-
quences for such actions on the utmost personal 
level. This is the sort of solidarity that liberation-
ists can respect, and, therefore, Tillich stands as a 
friend in theological conversation, not as an oppo-
nent whose work must be regarded as suspect and 
undermining of innovations in those theologies 
grounded in the personal and communal experi-
ences of those who are marginalized.  
Furthermore, Tillich affirmed personal experi-
ence as a theological source unto itself, alongside 
such traditional sources as the Bible, church his-
tory, and divine revelation. In Tillich’s method of 
correlation, it is possible to reach theological un-
derstanding only through an active engagement 
with the world whereby one asks questions of the 
reality which one inhabits and experiences. In ef-
fect, by requiring his theology to interact dynami-
cally with the issues of his existence and the poli-
tics and poetics of his day, Tillich modeled a per-
sonally, socially, and societally accountable way 
of theologizing. For liberation theologians, Tillich 
exemplified the possibilities of constructive theo-
logical innovation that delved deeply in the 
wounds and celebrations of present, human exis-
tence. In a sense, Tillich opened the door to other 
theologians so that they might feel justified in ar-
ticulating theologies that are relevant to their lived 
personal and social situations. The model of Til-
lich is not merely helpful but foundational in sup-
porting the theologian who seeks to address the 
oftentimes brutal and untenable complexities of 
the societies in which they live.  
Williams is such a theologian who has bene-
fited from Tillich’s groundbreaking desire to write 
socially responsive theology. I believe that her 
success as a systematic theologian is due to her 
uncommon capacities for infusing the qualities of 
what otherwise typifies prophetic preaching into 
the dynamism and complexities of her theological 
voice. I say this because her theology stands up to 
three important tests of prophetic preaching out-
lined by D. Stephen Long.2 First, just as the pro-
phetic preacher, Williams stands under the com-
munity of faith, and she is not set over and against 
it. Williams may have her quarrels with the Pres-
byterian Church as a denomination, but, in the 
words of William Sloane Coffin, these are lovers’ 
quarrels. Chances are that on any given Sunday 
morning, no matter what she has said earlier in the 
week that might shake the more orthodox among 
her denomination, Williams can be found sitting in 
the pew of her Presbyterian church as a devoted 
lay member. Second, Williams recognizes that to 
be prophetic is not in opposition to being pastoral, 
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for the work of the prophetic often is the most pas-
toral of activities. In this regard, Williams and oth-
er womanists have not been content to be heard in 
the ivory towers of seminaries and divinity schools 
alone, but have struggled to bring their messages 
to be heard in churches (and especially black 
churches!) by women and men, lay and ordained. I 
would say that Williams’ theologizing is not con-
tent to rest amidst libraries and classrooms, but 
demands to spill into the streets, to be relevant to 
the terrible loss of meaning that results from the 
imposition of white values upon black societies.  
Third, Williams recognizes that the prophetic 
is never discontinuous with the past, but finds re-
sources internal to the tradition of the community 
of faith to call that community to its true identity. 
Williams has been a paragon among liberation 
theologians in her diligence to unearth and claim 
the spiritual and experiential heritage of her fore-
bears, connecting their faith and lives to the reali-
ties of contemporary black women and men in the 
United States today. Once, Williams told me that 
she regards herself more as a “survivalist” than as 
a “liberationist,” and this is indicative of her con-
viction to hold on to the difficult dynamics of the 
past as educative and meaning-making, rather than 
desire to be freed from these histories into new 
realities. 
It is in this way that Williams can embrace 
Tillich’s experiences of exile and theological an-
thropology of alienation as those of a sympathetic 
journeyman alongside her altogether different life 
experiences and theological reflections as a black 
woman in the United States today who writes of 
her “wilderness experience.” In the remainder of 
this article, I will explain how it is that Tillich’s 
theological anthropology finds substance and 
resonance in Williams’ expositions on the strug-
gles of human life, and in particular, the lives of 
black women.  
 In this regard, it is important to review how 
Tillich understands what it means to be a human 
being living in the world. For Tillich, the structure 
of the human self, having a world to which it be-
longs and with which it can be in a subject-object 
dialogue, is preliminary to all other structural con-
cepts. Constituting Tillich’s basic ontological 
structure are pairs of elements: individuality and 
participation, dynamics and form, freedom and 
destiny. The conditions of existence not only ex-
press the power of being to exist, but differentiate 
essential and existential being. Finally, the catego-
ries of being and knowing are articulated as time, 
space, causality, and substance.3 
For Tillich, any doctrine of theological an-
thropology must deal with humankind as historical 
beings in historical memory. Without this sense of 
history, this integration of centered self and world 
in subjective relationship, there is a danger. De-
prived of our subjective elements, world and self 
crumble in the wake of a totally mechanical logic, 
and we struggle against this loss of subjectivity. 
This is a struggle against nonbeing, for the first 
step toward the personal annihilation wrought by 
nonbeing is to lose one’s meaning, one’s purpose, 
to be reduced in consideration and become merely 
a thing. 
When we are confronted by this shocking en-
counter with nonbeing, we are thrown into anxi-
ety, which Tillich defines as an awareness of our 
possible nonbeing through the experience of our 
finitude.4 Tillich wants to make sure that we do not 
confuse the ontological quality of anxiety with the 
psychological quality of fear. Anxiety is all perva-
sive, a part of being, whereas fear is impermanent 
and affects us through definite objects upon which 
we can act.5 Anxiety has no object, indeed is the 
negation of every object, and so anxiety cannot be 
acted upon through participation, struggle, or love. 
There is a certain sense, Tillich says, in which it is 
best to transform our anxiety into fear because 
graspable fear can be met by courage.6 
One type of anxiety is the anxiety of meaning-
lessness, which results from emptiness and loss of 
meaning, impinging upon our spiritual self-
affirmation. Tillich affirms that we are social crea-
tures, participating creatively in a world of mean-
ings.7 When nonbeing threatens that world of 
meanings, we feel irreparably separated from any 
ultimate concern.8 Since we relate to the world 
through meanings and values, the threat to our spi-
ritual being is a threat to our whole being.9  
There also is the anxiety of condemnation, by 
which our moral self-affirmation is tried by guilt 
and condemnation.10 We try to overcome our guilt 
through moral action, regardless of the imperfec-
tion and ambiguity of that action. Our attempts to 
do the moral good become demonically objective, 
turning moral action into a thing ungoverned by 
our subjectivity and not nuanced by faith. We try 
to do the good for our own alleviation from anxi-
ety of condemnation, rather than for God or 
humanity. Thus, even moral action is transformed 
by anxiety into a deluding concupiscence. The 
result of such unchecked anxieties leads to despair, 
Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 37, 3, Summer 2011 20 
of such unchecked anxieties leads to despair, 
whereby “a being is aware of itself as unable to 
affirm itself because of the power of nonbeing.” 
Following the Augsburg Confession, Augus-
tine, and Luther, Tillich provides the three 
concepts of “unbelief,” “hubris,” and “concupis-
cence” as the marks of our estrangement, the very 
state of human existence.11 The first concept, un-
belief, is that act or state in which we, in the total-
ity of our being, turn away from God, moving to-
ward the human center from the divine center. 
This is evident in the Augustinian interpretation of 
sin as love turning away from God to the self. That 
is to say, we actualize ourselves by turning to our-
selves and away from God. The second concept, 
hubris, is the self-elevation of human beings into 
the sphere of the divine. This is evident in Greek 
tragedy, in which people may make themselves the 
center of their own worlds, not acknowledging 
their own finitude. For Tillich, a demonic structure 
drives human beings to confuse natural self-
affirmation with destructive self-elevation. The 
third concept, concupiscence, is the unlimited de-
sire to draw the whole of reality into one’s self. 
These understandings of unbelief, hubris, and 
concupiscence bring us to the crux of the matter in 
our consideration of Tillich’s theological anthro-
pology, namely his portrayal of existential self-
destruction and the doctrine of evil. We are able to 
destroy ourselves in that we can transcend our 
world and ourselves through our actions and in our 
language. As such, we can make our world merely 
into an object that we behold, and we can make 
ourselves into mere objects upon which we look.12 
For Tillich, in the broad sense, evil is the 
negative in everything that includes destruction 
and estrangement, the totality of our existential 
predicament of sin and estrangement. The first 
mark of evil is the loss of one’s determining cen-
ter, the disintegration of the centered self by dis-
unifying, disruptive drives; Tillich calls this “self-
loss.”13 When this happens, our understanding of 
the world crumbles and we lose our power to have 
a meaningful encounter with the world. We ap-
proach the brink of personal disintegration as our 
centered self loses its integrity. Self and world are 
threatened, as world regresses into mere environ-
ment. As such, we are no longer human beings 
possessing a world, but the mere objects of “envi-
ronmental impact.”14 
In the state of estrangement, our ontological 
polarities are disrupted and they begin to separate, 
undermining their interdependence.15 Freedom and 
destiny are distorted into arbitrariness and me-
chanical necessity. Dynamics and form are bent 
into a formless urge for self-transcendence and an 
oppressive legalism. Individualization and partici-
pation are distorted into depersonalization and to-
tal abstraction. 
As we are estranged from the ultimate power 
of being, we are determined by our own finitude. 
Estrangement reaches out to distort and transform 
our understandings of the categories of finitude. 
Time, deprived of the power of being itself, be-
comes a “mere transitoriness without actual pres-
ence.”16 Space, likewise, is experienced as a “spa-
tial contingency,” meaning that we have no defi-
nite place of our own. Due to these conflicts, we 
undergo certain consequences: suffering and lone-
liness.17 Meaningless suffering is compounded by 
the “aloneness” of the person, and the hostility 
resulting from rejection when this desire is re-
jected by others. Loneliness is the defilement of 
“solitude,” that part of our essential finitude that 
allows us to have communion. In existential es-
trangement, we are cut off from the dimensions of 
the ultimate and left intolerably alone, leading us 
to surrender our lonely self to a larger “collective” 
rather than participate actively in “communion.” 
The courage to be that Tillich espouses “is essen-
tially always the courage to be as a part and the 
courage to be as oneself, in interdependence.”18 
Such courage to be is impossible in such an ex-
treme state of existential estrangement, which rav-
ages us with a legacy of doubt and meaningless-
ness. These structures of evil eventually drive hu-
man beings into the state of “despair,” the bound-
ary line beyond which we cannot go.19 It is in de-
spair that we come to the end of our possibilities, 
leaving us without hope, caught in inescapable 
conflict. 
Williams sympathizes with Tillich’s analysis 
of human existence, especially with regard to 
those people whose sense of existential estrange-
ment overwhelms their courage to be. Williams 
understands as her task to “reconstruct and redeem 
from invisibility the life-world of African-
American women,” articulating a theological voice 
that emerges from and is true to the ignored and 
suppressed religious perspective of black women 
in America.20 
As with Tillich, Williams pays close attention 
to the specific cultural situations that inform her 
theological work. Williams and other womanist 
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theologians understand that their position in soci-
ety bears close relation to the difficulties faced by 
white women and black men. Yet, the specific 
concerns of black women are addressed neither by 
the social advocacy nor by the theological per-
spectives of either group. For instance, while 
white women are confronted by patriarchy, Wil-
liams argues that black women also must grapple 
with “the productive patriarchal intent of white 
patriarchy.” This refers to the protection that the 
white-controlled institutions of American society 
provide to the children of white women, while 
those same institutions “intend the retardation of 
the intellectual, emotional, spiritual, economic, 
and physical growth of black women and the fruit 
of their wombs, male and female.”21 Appreciating 
Tillich’s penchant for introducing new verbiage 
into the vocabulary of systematic theology, Wil-
liams coins a term that describes this white-
dominated system that uses “racism, violence, vio-
lation, retardation, and death as instruments of so-
cial control”: demonarchy.22 Demonarchy is not 
constituted by individual acts of violence, but is a 
traditional and collective response by white people 
to black women, stemming from a belief by white 
people of their superiority to people of color. Due 
to the twin assaults of white patriarchy and de-
monarchy, it is understandable that Williams re-
jects integration as a viable option for black 
women in America.23 
Unfortunately, Williams finds that black 
communities do not offer black women any real 
respite from the difficulties presented by white-
dominated society, stricken by a dynamic interplay 
of alienating forces internal to the black communi-
ties. Williams reports that black women are far 
from protected or nurtured within the black com-
munity, but are subject to undermining and vio-
lence by the very men with whom they live.24 She 
points to examples in culture wherein black men 
view black women as frustrating their successes, 
as obstacles that must be overcome.25 Conse-
quently, black women may find themselves op-
pressed in the very places where they would seek 
sanctuary. 
In her ecclesiology, Williams places a high 
value on the black church as a locale where great 
good can occur, both symbolically and physically, 
and in this way Williams demonstrates an appre-
ciation for the capacities of the institutional church 
itself, which Tillich did not always share. She tes-
tifies that the church is “the foundation and spiri-
tual home of Black Christians…the creator of 
community, the sustainer of hope, the liberator 
redeeming the Black spirit from all that would de-
stroy it.”26 Yet, the black church has also been a 
“two-edged sword” for black women, as it has 
suppressed and made them invisible through the 
mind-set that Williams says is advocated by its 
“patriarchally and androcentrically biased liturgy 
and leadership.”27 Understanding the church as 
devoting itself to the derogation of women while 
there are a plethora of social ills that need to be 
addressed, Williams calls on the black church to 
understand the means by which it is being manipu-
lated.28 This manipulation is not so much driven 
from the outside by white powers and principali-
ties, but internally by black male imitations of 
white male patriarchy.29 In Tillich’s language, this 
is a demonstration of the destructive potentials of 
quasi-religions, whereby white male values are 
given such priority within American society that 
even those who suffer under such a system take up 
those values as their ground of being. 
Instead, Williams calls for both a rise in con-
sciousness and conscience within the black 
church. She demands that the church see the frac-
tures and fragmentation in the church and in the 
world, and that once aware, to address such active 
or implied violence directly. Williams says that, 
“If the church does not participate in the work of 
bringing social salvation to the suffering and vio-
lated ones, it has no mission to speak of. It has no 
life in Christ.”30 Rather, Williams maintains, it is 
the responsibility of the black church to be the 
harbinger of change, the locus of organization, the 
backbone of the community.  
Williams reflects Tillich’s commitment to 
examining human beings, singly and collectively, 
as historical beings in historical memory. One of 
Williams’ most significant contributions to 
womanist theology’s understanding of oppression 
is her social and theological analysis of the history 
of surrogacy roles endured by black women, a 
continual barrier to any socially-located 
soteriology.31 This continues to the present day, as 
black women endure the appropriation of their 
sexuality, procreative powers, and capacity to 
nurture.32 While Williams firmly places the blame 
for the establishment of surrogacy upon white 
people, she does note that black men have also had 
a hand in keeping black women in the service of 
other people’s needs and goals.33 The recurring 
theme in Williams’ theological corpus is that 
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while white society began and continues the 
oppression of black women, black men have 
contributed to the perpetuation of black women’s 
oppression as well. 
Providing the nuances and specificities im-
plicit to a Tillichian sense of systemic alienation, 
Williams argues that accompanying this imposi-
tion of surrogacy roles throughout history is the 
white propensity to “scapegoat” black people in 
the United States.34 This cultural aversion to 
Blackness is instituted not only through culture, 
science, and politics, but also through the very 
symbols, signs, and images of Christianity.35 This 
social conditioning has led to a national con-
sciousness that looks not only upon blackness, but 
also upon black people as dangerous and neces-
sary to suppress. Williams attributes this persis-
tent, oppressive force to “white racial narcissism,” 
which she sees as the overvaluation of white skin 
color to the “pathological point of using the 
[white] group’s power and authority to persecute 
others who are not of that skin color.”36 This is 
representative of Tillich’s understanding of hubris, 
whereby human beings attempt a self-elevation 
into the sphere of the divine. White racial narcis-
sism sees only white skin color as being of value, 
of bearing a certain priority and potency, and 
thereby in its elevation of the self, white racial 
narcissism cannot witness to the imago Dei im-
plicit to every human being. 
This combination of surrogacy, scapegoating, 
and anti-black sentiment has led to societal nega-
tive stereotypes of black women. Yet, what is most 
disturbing about this is that the constant exposure 
to externally imposed negative perceptions of 
black women has led to a fundamental undermin-
ing of black women’s perceptions of themselves. 
Another way that black women come to feel “un-
worthy” is through the indifference of governmen-
tal structures in responding to the concerns of 
black women. Historically, the white-dominated 
governance has ignored black women who were 
raped, lynched, and overworked by white men and 
white women. Williams assigns a theological ver-
biage to this combination, the devaluation of black 
women’s humanity and the defilement of their 
bodies: “the social sin American patriarchy and 
demonarchy have committed against Black 
women and their children.”37 This, then, is the first 
order of sin as properly understood by Williams, 
sin in a social sense. Tillich once claimed that a 
person becomes a person in the encounter with 
persons and in no other way.38 Williams would 
seem to be in agreement with Tillich in this, for 
the evidence of our better natures and our worst 
proclivities emerge from our encounters with oth-
ers in the communities with which we live. 
Williams’ analysis of social sin is historical 
and deep, examining three deposits of the black 
community’s religious culture: spiritual songs, 
autobiographical statements, and black theology.39 
What she mines out of these traditions is a con-
temporary womanist concept of sin that can be 
understood in four senses. First, the womanist no-
tion of sin takes the human body and its sexuality 
seriously, finding any abuse of one’s body and 
sexuality that amounts to defilement as sin. Sec-
ond, Williams equates black womanhood and hu-
manity as synonymous, both being in the image of 
God, as is one’s sexuality. Therefore, to devalue 
womanhood or sexuality is a sin. Third, contribut-
ing to the depletion of black women’s self-esteem 
is sinful, and thereby the elevation and healing of 
black women’s self-esteem is what constitutes sal-
vation. Fourth, Williams parallels the defilement 
of black women’s bodies and the defilement of 
nature. It should be noted that all of these consti-
tute social sin visited upon black women by those 
who are not themselves black women, primarily 
white men, white women, and black men.  
Williams is also careful to name what amounts 
to individual sin, claiming that when one partici-
pates “in society’s systems that devalue Black 
women’s womanhood (humanity) through a proc-
ess of invisibilization—that is, invisibilizing the 
womanist character of Black women’s experience 
and emphasizing the stereotypical images of Black 
women that prevail and are perpetuated by the 
larger society,” one is committing individual sin.40 
To be sure, black women can also commit such 
individual sin. They do so when they do not chal-
lenge the social systems of patriarchy and demon-
archy that defile black women’s bodies and de-
grade their self-esteem. To succumb, to not em-
brace the courage to be, is the very nature of indi-
vidual sin in Williams’ systematic theology. 
The result of this encounter with sin is ex-
hausting for black women on a multidimensional 
level that affects one’s spirit, comfort, health, and 
groundedness. Williams eloquently maintains that 
this “spiritual desolation yields a state of unre-
lieved restlessness and anxiety. A person in spiri-
tual desolation suffers a profound emptiness, a 
sense of being lost in shadows.”41 When black 
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women refer to a “wilderness experience,” accord-
ing to Williams, they are depicting a place of deso-
lation, “where one is exhausted and spent and 
needs an infusion of faith, a shower of God’s 
grace.”42 And when confronted by this “near-
destruction situation” of the wilderness experi-
ence, a very Tillichian despair in the face of non-
being, Williams maintains that “God gives per-
sonal direction to the believer and thereby helps 
her make a way out of what she thought was no 
way.”43 
It is in this way that Williams grounds her un-
derstanding of black women’s survival experience 
through the biblical character of Hagar, rather than 
in the exodus-based liberation experience that pre-
dominantly is lifted up by black theology.44 What 
is remarkable about this survival model is the 
strong sense that it is not the black woman alone, 
but the black woman and her family (and by ex-
tension, her community) that are enabled by God 
to struggle on despite the forces arraigned against 
them. Williams finds that the liberationist model 
ultimately leads to hopelessness and desperation, 
as the models of liberation do not match the expe-
rience of black people in America. Rather, it is the 
survivalist model—of a people that continue on, 
enduring pain and hardship, directed and accom-
panied by a God who does not necessarily set 
them free—that seems most appropriate to the ex-
perience of black people, and black women in par-
ticular, in the context of the United States. In a 
similar vein, Tillich’s New Being does not prom-
ise alleviation from all of one’s trials and tribula-
tions, but provides the means for getting through 
those most difficult struggles. 
As the liberationist models of white women 
and black men fail the particularities of black 
women, Williams finds it important that black 
women undergo a process of self-invention. One 
of the ways that black women have undertaken 
this self-invention is by writing literature in such a 
way that the literature “makes a woman real to 
herself.”45 Williams also points to certain cultural 
forms as ways by which black women have de-
parted from traditional theories of atonement and 
sanctification, and self-invented themselves in 
powerful, life-enhancing ways. These include the 
“black is beautiful” cultural revolutions of the 
1960s, the “musical form of lamentation” of the 
Blues, and the cultural experiences of the black 
church worship tradition, including gospel music, 
praise services and praise songs, the experience of 
joy as the Spirit moves in the worship space, and 
the “well-organized, inspiring and energetic ser-
mons that some of the preachers deliver.”46 Yet, 
Williams is careful to assert that spiritual devel-
opments must go beyond self-reliance, instead 
seeking out a spiritual life that is nurtured by one’s 
experiences with the sacred, and through the sa-
cred, encounters with God.47 This too is in tune 
with Tillich’s advocacy for cultural forms that lead 
toward participation with the divine, while not 
supplanting the divine with our sense of wonder at 
our own creativeness. 
Thus, an important re-valuation that black 
women must do in the work of womanist theology 
is to come to new understandings of God and to 
embrace new imagery invested with religiously 
symbolic meaning. For Williams, redemption has 
to do with God, through Jesus, giving human be-
ings a new vision by which humanity might ascer-
tain the resources of ethics and praxis that allow 
one to build positive, abundant, relational lives.48 
Thus, in Williams’ re-visioning of Christology, it 
is important to emphasize that the salvific work of 
Christ is accomplished not in the surrogacy-
imbued symbolism of his death for other’s sins on 
a cross,49 but through what he represented and 
worked toward in his life.50  
As with Tillich, Williams bears little patience 
for a church that is irrelevant to the challenges 
presented by world that it inhabits, meaning that 
the Christian message does not answer the existen-
tial questions of the humanity of today.51 Williams 
will not allow a continuation of the state of leth-
argy she observes in the Christian church,52 for she 
sees such inactivity as nothing other than a be-
trayal when Christians “live comfortably and pas-
sively within socially and politically constructed 
boundaries which prohibit community, dehuman-
ize people, and destroy the lives and cultures of 
other Christians.”53 Consequently, Williams calls 
for a “Church Without Walls,” a church which is 
involved in the practical economic, political, 
physical, and spiritual needs of the black commu-
nity.54 Such a church would ideally foster the “life-
line politics” being implemented by black women, 
as such political strategies are implicitly supported 
by religious practices.55 Such a church would work 
toward social salvation by developing and trans-
forming black communities,56 and would not be-
come mired in intra-church struggles or the op-
pression of its own members. 
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Staying with her womanist survival/quality-of-
life hermeneutic, Williams would preach among 
black Christians that liberation is ultimate, “but in 
the meantime survival and prosperity must be the 
experience of our people.”57 This is in accord with 
the experience of Williams’ depiction of Hagar, 
who was not passive in the face of despair and the 
threats to her life and to her son’s life. How the 
present moment can be improved is, for Williams, 
a task that is undertaken in concert by the individ-
ual, by the family, by the community, and by the 
church. 
In my reading, Williams is an example of the 
sort of theologian who takes on Tillich’s challenge 
that Christian theology must speak to the contem-
porary issues and questions of its day, and in so 
doing, systematic theology must always be in a 
state of revision and renewal. Recognizing along-
side Tillich that human beings are historical beings 
situated in historical memory, Williams has 
worked to uncover and recover the lived realities 
of her ancestors, and sought to bring the contem-
porary situation of people, and black women in 
particular, into conversation with the present-day 
reverberations of the past. Over the course of her 
career as a womanist theologian, Williams has 
constructed a theological position and a following 
that demand social relevancy if theology is to be 
Christian at all. She has looked to Tillich’s exam-
ple, for he wrote so acutely on human experience 
amidst the vast changes in the world from the First 
World War until the social revolutions of the 
1960s. In this way, Williams’ work as a systematic 
theologian has focused not so much on the doc-
trines of God, Trinity, or revelation, whereby her 
focus would be primarily upon those theological 
themes dealing with the externalities that work 
upon humankind and Creation “from above.” In-
stead, Williams has grappled deeply with the par-
ticularities of what it means to be a human being 
living in societies that are themselves composed of 
many interlocking communities, focusing on theo-
logical anthropology, the doctrine of the Christian 
life, the nature of social and individual sin, and 
atonement.  
Along with Tillich, Williams has authored a 
theology that is unafraid to confront the realities of 
the sinner who is sinned against and who sins 
against herself, all along loved by a God who does 
not interrupt and arrest this painful process. This 
theology is forged from the fires of intense real-
ism, convinced that while liberation is an admira-
ble ideal, first it is necessary to develop the per-
sonal and faithful elements that allow survival so 
that one might thrive at all. To accomplish this, 
Williams confronts the vagaries of human life in a 
way that seems inspired by Tillich, but also sur-
passing Tillich due to her attention to the details of 
the particularities of black women’s lives in the 
United States. While their analyses may be differ-
ent, both Tillich and Williams arrive at a similar 
place. While Tillich pointed to the despair that 
results from the encounter with non-being, Wil-
liams understood the importance of confronting 
the meaninglessness and self-doubt that is inspired 
by invisibility and personal devaluation of the self 
amidst a society that corporately devalues the self 
according to one’s race and gender. It is in this 
way that a theologian who suffered exile during a 
time of tremendous social and political unrest has 
been an important influence upon a theologian 
who has experienced the wilderness of her own 
times of tremendous social and political unrest in 
America. 
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Introduction: The Use and Abuse of Judaism 
 
 In April of 1933, soon after Adolf Hitler came 
to power, Paul Tillich was suspended from the 
University of Frankfurt for speaking out against 
Nazi intimidation of leftist students, and for being 
a “well known religious socialist.”1 Tillich was 
one of over 1,600 German academics that were 
either fired or suspended for either being Jews or 
critics of the Nazi regime. In May, he was initially 
instructed by the Ministry of Education to remain 
in Germany until a final decision was made on his 
case.2 Around the same time, he was offered a po-
sition by Reinhold Niebuhr at Union Theological 
Seminary in New York. However, as a loyal Ger-
man, Tillich hesitated, and traveled around Ger-
many seeking advice and counsel as to whether he 
should leave the country. In October of 1933, as 
the situation in Germany deteriorated, Tillich 
called for a meeting with an official at the Minis-
try of Culture in Berlin as he was anxious to de-
termine the final disposition of his case.  
 
In a 1959 interview for Time magazine, Tillich 
recalls the pivotal moment when he decided to 
leave Germany and seek political asylum in the 
United States: “For a full hour, we discussed the 
Old Testament and the importance to Christianity 
of the Jewish tradition. At the end of the hour I 
knew it was over.”3 Adolf Löwe also relates that in 
this interview, the Nazi official also asked Tillich 
to retract The Socialist Decision,4 in return for the 
prestigious chair of Theology at the University of 
Berlin. Tillich reportedly laughed in his face.5 The 
Nazi official recommended that Tillich leave 
Germany for a couple of years for his own safety, 
but that he expected things to improve within a 
few years so that Tillich could safely return. After 
agonizing over this, Tillich decided to emigrate. 
Aside from concern for his personal safety, this 
pivotal interview reveals what was most important 
to Tillich, what he found non-negotiable about the 
Nazi regime, and the importance of Judaism and 
the Old Testament to Christian theology.  
Why is Tillich’s view of the Old Testament 
and Judaism important? Tillich’s support for the 
Jews and his critique of National Socialism are 
well documented.6 As for the Old Testament, Til-
lich is quite clear about the importance of the pro-
phetic tradition, but he has left no explicit treat-
ment of the Old Testament. Due to his philosophi-
cal exegesis and use of ontology, Tillich does not 
present an explicit doctrine of Scripture, but dis-
cusses its role in the context of other topics.7 As 
for his understanding of Judaism, it appears at key 
points in his career and in his written works, as 
will be demonstrated below.  
 In Europe and the West, the posture of the 
Christian churches toward Judaism has had major 
social implications for Jews. This is a vast topic, 
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with many historical, theological, sociological, and 
political dimensions. One example of an adversar-
ial theological perspective is the Adversus Judaeos 
tradition, as analyzed by Rosemary Radford 
Ruether, both in a 1991 essay and in her exhaus-
tive 1974 study Faith and Fratricide.8 This tradi-
tion became common in Western Christianity dur-
ing the Patristic period, from the second century 
into the fifth century. The Adversus Judaeos tradi-
tion was initially used for polemical purposes by 
Christian theologians in response to Jewish efforts 
to delegitimize Christianity in the eyes of the Ro-
man government.9 According to Ruether, the Ad-
versus Judaeos tradition of patristic exegesis 
maintains an anti-Judaic “left hand,” which at-
tempts to demonstrate why the Jewish community 
did not accept Jesus as the fulfillment of its own 
tradition. This viewpoint became a hermeneutical 
lens through which all of Judaism was condemned 
as the negative mirror image of Christianity.10 
While the causal link between the Adversus Ju-
daeos tradition and genocidal anti-Semitism may 
not be so ineluctable, at a minimum it is clear that 
the Christian church, at specific points in its 
history, has fostered an antagonistic attitude to-
ward the Jewish religion to the significant detri-
ment of certain Jewish communities.  
 In this paper, I will argue that Judaism plays 
three different roles for Tillich that change over 
time, and that each role corresponds to an impor-
tant emphasis in Tillich’s thought in a distinct 
phase of his theological development. The first 
role that Judaism plays is that of a necessary, pre-
paratory role for Christianity, which exhibits the 
influence of German idealism and the history of 
religions, and is most clearly exhibited in Tillich’s 
two doctoral dissertations on Schelling, written in 
1910 and 1912. The importance of Schelling on 
Tillich’s thought, which will be discussed later, 
cannot be overstated.11 The second role that Juda-
ism plays is that of a permanent, prophetic critique 
of Christianity. Tillich’s concept of religious so-
cialism, which appropriates prophetic expectation 
to challenge the nationalistic idolatry of the Na-
tional Socialist regime, is expressed in “the Jewish 
spirit.” This clearly and forcefully is exhibited in 
Tillich’s The Socialist Decision. The third distinct 
role that Judaism plays, while not abandoning the 
prior two, is that of a mirror image the German 
people. Tillich engages in a psychological and so-
ciological analysis of German culture, and of “the 
German personality,” in an attempt to explain the 
pathological behavior of Germany in carrying out 
the Holocaust. This can be seen most pointedly in 
Tillich’s Berlin “Judenfrage” lectures in 1953.12  
In the first phase of Tillich’s thought, the his-
tory-of-religions-school is foundational, but after 
World War I, Tillich turns his attention to wider 
political realities, and writes a work of true politi-
cal theology. In this third phase, in light of World 
War II and the Holocaust, psychology and sociol-
ogy emerge as new, integral elements in his under-
standing of the relationship between Christianity 
and Judaism. In all three instances, Judaism is un-
derstood in a theoretical sense, but only in the sec-
ond and third instances does it have significant 
implications for social reality. In all three in-
stances, there is a dialectic involved, which over 
time has a cumulative effect, so that by the time of 
the Judenfrage lectures, the dialectic retains con-
cepts from the first two periods, but adds new 
ideas as well. This is what I will later refer to as 
Tillich’s “dialectic of the Holy.” 
 
Part One: The Importance of Schelling for 
Tillich  
 
 It is difficult to appreciate fully Tillich’s 
thought without understanding the influence of 
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854), 
who, along with Hegel, has become associated 
with German idealism. This perspective employed 
an evolutionary view of history to interpret the 
role of various world religions in deriving increas-
ingly more sophisticated forms, typically pointing 
to western Christianity as the highest form. In Til-
lich’s autobiography, On the Boundary,13 Tillich 
recalls how he had voraciously read classical 
German philosophy, especially Kant and Fichte, 
and later Schelling. His interest in Schelling was 
stirred by both a predisposition (“inner affinity”) 
towards the relationship between nature, mysti-
cism, and history, and unexpectedly found the 
complete works of Schelling in a used bookstore, 
what he came to refer to as the “the accident of a 
bargain purchase.”14 The importance of Schelling 
remained with Tillich through his entire life. For 
example, when he had completed the third volume 
of his Systematic Theology in 1963, Tillich re-
marked that Schelling was the teacher and he was 
merely the student.15 As part of my argument, I 
will show that the influence of Schelling remains 
in the second and third phases of Tillich’s thought, 
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the prophetic socialist phase and the social-
psychological phase.  
 The first of his two dissertations on Schelling, 
The Construction of the History of Religion in 
Schelling’s Positive Philosophy: Its Presupposi-
tions and Principles,16 was submitted in 1910 for 
his doctorate in philosophy at the University of 
Breslau. The second, Mysticism and Guilt-
Consciousness in Schelling’s Philosophical De-
velopment,17 was submitted for the licentiate in 
theology at the University of Halle. In the intro-
duction to the 1910 Dissertation, Tillich argues 
that while Schelling was in a sense the teacher of 
Hegel and Schleiermacher, the latter two became 
the objects of extensive scholarly commentary, 
while Schelling regrettably fell into neglect.18 In 
both dissertations Tillich seeks to rescue Schelling 
from relative obscurity, and explore Schelling’s 
significance for his own thought. In the simplest 
terms, in the 1910 Dissertation, Tillich appropri-
ates Schelling for philosophical purposes, and then 
in the 1912 Dissertation, Tillich appropriates 
Schelling for theological purposes, with philoso-
phy providing a necessary foundation for theol-
ogy. However, there is considerable overlap be-
tween philosophy and theology in Schelling, as 
Tillich observes that idealism possesses an essen-
tially religious dimension or “self-consciousness,” 
expressed in Schelling’s concept of “philosophical 
religion.”19  
 
The 1910 Dissertation: Judaism as a Transi-
tional Dialectical Participant in the History of 
Religion 
 The 1910 Dissertation has three parts. Part 
One discusses the epistemological and metaphysi-
cal foundations of Schelling’s dialectical view of 
reality, focusing on the three “potencies,” which 
are principles that characterize change within God, 
nature, humanity, and history. According to Til-
lich, Schelling’s three potencies are subject, ob-
ject, and spirit. In the most simple terms, subject is 
“what can be,” or pure potency; object is “what 
must be,” or pure act; and spirit is “what ought to 
be,” or the goal.20 All of reality experiences change 
in a progression among the three potencies, start-
ing with “subject,” which is opposed by “object,” 
with both contributing to one degree or another, in 
a teleological fashion, to “spirit.” However, the 
conflict between subject and object does not result 
in a simple “fifty-fifty” combination in the emer-
gence of spirit, nor is it a simple linear progres-
sion. Rather, spirit reflects the relative success or 
failure of subject and object in their conflict, and 
neither is completely annihilated. Each potency 
makes an enduring contribution to spirit, with the 
magnitude of that contribution reflecting the rela-
tive success of each potency, subject and object, in 
the struggle. This is Schelling’s dialectical view of 
reality, which Tillich largely adopts in his own 
thought and uses throughout his entire career. This 
dynamic view of reality became characteristic of 
19th century Romanticism, and is like Hegel’s dia-
lectic, except that it is perhaps more volatile. In 
Tillich’s lectures on the history of Christian 
thought, he says Schelling’s whole philosophy of 
nature was an attempt to show the indwelling of 
the potential spirit in all natural objects and its ful-
fillment in man.21  
 Part Two, called “The History of Religion,” 
employs the dialectic of the potencies in a devel-
opment of the history of religion. It has two sec-
tions, the first discussing the presence of “mythol-
ogy” within a comprehensive, cross-cultural view 
of human history. The discussion of mythology 
begins with “absolute prehistoric time,” discussing 
the dialectical inner life of God. In an act of com-
plete divine freedom, the divine emanates by es-
sentially creating the physical world, which brings 
about the emergence of humanity, historical time, 
and human history. Schelling metaphorically re-
fers to this as “the Fall.”22 For Schelling, the his-
tory of religion demonstrates the emergence and 
the contributions of all major religions and phi-
losophies and their conflict and transformation; the 
cumulative effect ultimately is a contribution to 
the emergence of Christianity.23 Human history 
moves in a dialectical sequence, starting with 
mythological religions of the ancient Near East, 
Greece, and India, which are then opposed by the 
anti-mythological religions and philosophies of 
China, Persian Manichaeism, and Buddhism, 
which are then followed by rational religion, of 
which post-Exilic Judaism is one example. This 
dialectical sequence of mythological, anti-
mythological, and rational religions is also re-
ferred to by Schelling as “paganism.” Due to the 
limitations of human reason, in all of its historical 
and cultural diversity, paganism experiences a “ca-
tastrophe of the rational process.”24 This catastro-
phe prepares the way for religions of revelation 
discussed in the second section of Part Two, Juda-
ism, Islam (“Mohammedanism”), and Christianity. 
Part Three, which discusses the religious, histori-
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cal, and philosophical principles used in the con-
struction of the history of religion, also has two 
parts, the first discussing the concept of religion 
and the second discussing the concept of history.  
 According to Tillich’s reconstruction of the 
history of religion, Judaism passed through three 
historical stages, with the first stage having pagan, 
rational, and revelatory elements. The first stage is 
the development of Mosaic religion, which in-
volves the receiving of the Mosaic Law, a rational 
element, and the temptations of polytheism, a 
remnant of paganism. In addition, this stage exhib-
its the command for Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, 
with the idea of human sacrifice also exhibiting 
remnants of paganism, and the names of God al-
ternating between Elohim and Jehovah as in-
stances of divine revelation, as contrasted to the 
“nameless God of prehistory.”25 The second stage 
is that of Prophetism, or “the spiritual understand-
ing of the Mosaic law and the prophecy of the 
spiritual religion of the future.”26 As an instance of 
Schelling’s dialectic, the prophetic religion of Is-
rael drew upon elements of the Mosaic law, and 
transcended them, in a teleological manner: 
“Spirit, the potency of the future, speaks already 
in the prophets of Israel [emphasis mine] and 
leads beyond the law, without, however, annulling 
it for the present.”27   
 The third stage is that of normative Judaism, 
whose specific features are not clearly delineated, 
except that it rejects mythology entirely,28 and that 
it has both a rational and a revelatory dimension. 
In the section immediately following the discus-
sion of Judaism and Islam, which begins the dis-
cussion of revelation, paganism and Judaism are 
paired together, as both having a rational dimen-
sion that fails. This paves the way for revelation: 
“Paganism and Judaism both pointed beyond 
themselves by prophesying a perfect religion of 
the future; and both ended in a catastrophe that 
realized the negative moment of the prophecy and 
made the positive moment an urgent demand.”29 In 
addition, further on in Part Three, Judaism and 
Christianity are paired together as both having a 
revelatory dimension: “The concept of revelation 
has a comprehensive significance for Schelling. It 
includes Judaism and Christianity within itself, 
and signifies the supernatural efficacy of the sec-
ond potency in contrast to its natural efficacy in 
paganism.”30 The first two stages of Judaism, Mo-
saic religion and prophetism, can be tied to his-
torical periods. In the third stage, that of normative 
Judaism, there is no association with any specific 
historical expression of Judaism, such as Second 
Temple or Rabbinic Judaism. Further, in this pa-
per, I will show how Tillich appropriates a similar 
non-historical view of Judaism in The Socialist 
Decision.  
 
The 1912 Dissertation: Judaism’s Bondage to a 
Wrathful God Points to Grace 
Mysticism and guilt-consciousness, the feeling 
of unity with the absolute and consciousness 
of opposition to God, the principle of the iden-
tity of the absolute and individual spirit, and 
the experience of contradiction between Holy 
Lord and sinful creature: this is the antinomy 
for whose solution religious thought in the 
Church in every age has struggled and must 
continually struggle.31 
The above passage is the opening sentence of 
the 1912 Dissertation, which summarizes the re-
curring problem of the contradiction between truth 
and morality as applied to religion. Tillich ob-
serves that there are two fundamental, common 
religious experiences, or impulses. The first is un-
ion between the individual and the divine, ex-
plained philosophically as “identity,” and relig-
iously as “mysticism.” The second impulse is fear 
of the holy, explained philosophically as the con-
tradiction between self-interest and obligation, and 
religiously as “guilt-consciousness.” The structure 
of Tillich’s thought is deeply indebted to Kant,32 
and Tillich throughout his career responds in one 
way or another to Kant’s three critiques: whether it 
be to the “prison of finitude,”33 as determined by 
the limits of science, in the Critique of Pure Rea-
son; the religious implications of the conflict be-
tween self-interest and obligation in the Critique 
of Practical Reason; or the manifestation of the 
divine in artistic expression, as in the Critique of 
Judgment. In the 1910 Dissertation, Tillich pro-
vides an extensive articulation of the history of 
religion, followed by a relatively brief religious 
and theological application. In the 1912 Disserta-
tion, the emphasis is reversed, with most of the 
analysis devoted to the problems posed by Kant, 
with a shorter concluding section devoted to their 
resolution within the history of religion. In both 
dissertations, Judaism receives a relatively brief 
analysis, although its role is pivotal. 
 The 1912 Dissertation also has three parts. 
Part One, called the “Historical-Dialectical Foun-
dation of the Problem,” provides the theoretical 
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basis for the problem by demonstrating the recur-
ring contradiction between the experience of one-
ness with God and the experience of alienation 
from God. Tillich begins with a discussion of pre-
Kantian philosophy, which is followed by a dis-
cussion of Kant’s three Critiques referred to 
above. Part Two discusses the variety of ways that 
mysticism and identity function within the earlier 
Schelling, in his speculative (“negative”) philoso-
phy, and the limitations of ethical concepts to 
comprehend and resolve the original contradiction 
between truth and morality. Part Two closes with a 
section called “The Destruction of the Moral Cat-
egories,” in which Tillich introduces several 
metaphors used by Schelling to transcend the lim-
its of traditional ethical categories. One metaphor 
is the “ethical genius,” or “man of God,” who ex-
periences a “supra-intellectual” unity of knowl-
edge and action (intuition), and who exercises his 
will with a freedom that is analogous to divine 
freedom.34 Tillich concludes this section by show-
ing that one pole of the original contradiction, 
“guilt consciousness,” cannot possibly resolve the 
contradiction, especially if it is expressed solely in 
intellectual terms. This sets the stage for a fuller 
development of theological concepts in Part Three. 
 In Part Three of the 1912 Dissertation, Tillich 
discusses Schelling’s attempt to synthesize mysti-
cism and guilt-consciousness in his later period, 
where he develops his “positive” philosophy.  
There are two main sections, with the first discuss-
ing several overtly theological concepts, such as 
sin, guilt, wrath, and grace, called “The Solution in 
Principle.” It is in the second section, called “The 
Religio-Historical Solution,” which recapitulates 
some of the material from the 1910 Dissertation, 
where Tillich re-visits Schelling’s views on history 
and religion, including the role of Judaism. Similar 
to the treatment of Judaism in the 1910 Disserta-
tion, here Judaism plays a transitional role from 
paganism, characterized by its mythological ele-
ments, to Christianity, characterized by its revela-
tory elements. Paganism is in “bondage to God” as 
“grievous sacrifices are made to assuage the con-
sciousness of guilt,”35 which for Schelling (and 
Tillich) is an instance of heightened contradiction 
that calls for a forward movement in the dialectic 
of the potencies. Whereas paganism is “under the 
sway of contradiction,”36 Judaism is the first his-
torical instance of an attempt to resolve this con-
tradiction through its revelatory elements, and 
therefore paves the way for Christianity. 
 In the penultimate section of the 1912 Disser-
tation, titled “The Struggle of the Law against the 
Contradiction: Judaism,” Tillich presents Schel-
ling as comparing paganism and Judaism, with 
Judaism sharing some features of paganism, but 
also transcending it. Both paganism and Judaism 
experience the divine as wrathful, although pagan-
ism experiences nature as capricious and 
impossible to control through rituals and sacri-
fices. However, whereas paganism evolves in a 
purely naturalistic dialectic of the potencies, Juda-
ism experiences a revelatory confrontation of the 
divine self against nature, through the call of 
Abraham and the giving of the law to Moses. Fur-
ther, while paganism subsumes the individual in a 
mystical union with divinized nature, Judaism cul-
tivates individual spirituality, in relation to a tran-
scendent God and in response to the Mosaic Law, 
although that spirituality is unable to transcend 
guilt-consciousness. In footnote 51 to this section, 
Tillich says that paganism and Judaism have a 
common starting point in that each is bound to 
God through God’s wrath. While paganism “loses 
itself” in this bond, Judaism resists this bond and 
“creates a real solution” through a personal rela-
tionship to God in obedience to Mosaic Law, but 
stalls at that stage, as “guilt-consciousness remains 
the characteristic form of Jewish piety.”37   
 At the same time, it is this personal relation-
ship with God, through the law, that anticipates 
Christianity, and enables Tillich to pair Judaism 
with Christianity:  
It might have been possible to treat Judaism 
together with paganism, inasmuch as in Juda-
ism also the contradiction has not yet been 
overcome. On the other hand, it cannot be 
maintained that the contradiction prevails 
there. It was resisted, and in every act of obe-
dience to the law it was overcome. But above 
all—and this is decisive for Schelling—in Ju-
daism, God confronts the contradiction 
through revelation, i.e., personally, so that in 
this connection (which is the more important 
one) Judaism and Christianity belong to-
gether.38 
 Tillich concludes the penultimate section of 
the 1912 Dissertation by anticipating the distinct 
revelatory character of Christianity: 
In the fullness of time mysticism in its perfect 
form was crushed under the burden of the 
moral demand and of divine wrath in pagan-
ism, and guilt-consciousness was obscured by 
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the highest, namely, religious elevation of the 
principle of selfhood in Judaism, but just then, 
in the pagan mysteries and in the messianic 
expectations of the Jews, the true God was 
prophesied.39  
 
Part Two: Tillich’s The Socialist Decision: Ju-
daism as the Spirit of Prophetic Expectation 
 
 After the trauma and devastation of World 
War I, Tillich returned to Germany and tapped 
into a deep current of anti-monarchial and anti-
capitalist sentiment, in reaction to the failures of 
Wilhelmine Germany. While in Frankfurt from 
1929 to 1933, Tillich cultivated relationships with 
numerous intellectuals, some of whom were Jew-
ish, who later became known as the “Frankfurt 
School.” Through this interaction, Tillich became 
a proponent of “religious socialism,” which avoids 
the reductionism and alienation found in capitalist 
societies, and the totalitarianism found in Com-
munist societies and in German National Social-
ism. This idea was given its fullest expression in 
The Socialist Decision. 
 When one first looks at The Socialist Deci-
sion, it is not obvious why it would be banned by 
the Nazis. It is a highly theoretical work since it 
discusses concepts that are associated with Marxist 
political theory, such as the bourgeoisie, the prole-
tariat, socialism, capitalism, and historical and dia-
lectical materialism. Communism is denounced, 
Hitler is never named directly, and the term 
Führer appears five times, four times in a purely 
descriptive capacity. The most inflammatory 
comment is an oblique reference to Hitler within 
an analysis of the socialist view of human nature 
about halfway through the book. Tillich observes 
that socialism—as opposed to religious socialism, 
which is discussed below—is unduly influenced 
by the bourgeois view of human nature, which 
valorizes harmony and rationality, and fails to ac-
count for the limits of rationality, the inevitability 
of conflict, and the recurring economic crises 
brought on by the competitiveness of capitalism 
and wars caused by nationalism and imperialism. 
In its current German context, socialism has failed 
to raise up powerful and charismatic leaders, and 
at the same time has permitted “a personality with 
trivial power of being” to “become the symbol and 
Führer of revolutionary political romanticism.”40 
This, of course, refers to Hitler and German Na-
tional Socialism. Nevertheless, this book, due to 
its incisive criticisms of German National Social-
ism just as Hitler came to power, was immediately 
banned, and it was consigned to the flames in the 
Frankfurt book burnings of May,1933.41 However, 
Tillich’s unwillingness to retract it caused an ir-
reconcilable rift between him and the German 
government. Tillich was quite proud of this work, 
and his Jewish friend Adolf Löwe remarked that it 
was Tillich’s “most Jewish book.”42  
 As with all of Tillich’s works, he begins with 
a statement of principles and presuppositions, and 
here he states that all political thought and action 
rests on the duality of human nature and the two 
roots of political thought. Human nature, in all 
times and places, is comprised of “being” and 
“consciousness.” Being refers to the bodily aspect 
of human existence, which is subject to the cycle 
of birth, growth and development, and death, and 
is something humankind shares with all living be-
ings. On the other hand, consciousness is distinc-
tive to human beings, and refers to their individual 
and collective reflective capacity, and their ability 
to ascribe meaning to being, which is the cycle of 
birth, growth and development, and death. This 
anthropological duality is not unique to Tillich, but 
is common within 20th century Continental phi-
losophy and has its roots in ancient Greek philoso-
phy. 
 There are two roots of political thought. The 
first is the “origin” and the second is the “de-
mand.” All societies seek to understand their ori-
gin, as their beliefs, practices, and institutions an-
swer the question, “Whence?” (Woher?), which 
Tillich refers to as the “myth of origin.”43 This 
universal phenomenon, also described by Tillich 
as the “consciousness” of a society, yields a wide 
variety of mythological expressions in human his-
tory and across cultures, and is reminiscent of Til-
lich’s dissertations on Schelling. While the content 
of these mythological expressions varies, they all 
have in common the attempt to understand the 
natural cycle of birth, growth and development, 
and death. Tillich is critical of a culture when it 
fails to transcend this natural cycle, beyond what 
“is,” and remains oriented to the myth of origin.44 
Tillich concludes, with emphasis, “The conscious-
ness oriented to the myth of origin is the root of all 
conservative and romantic thought in politics.”45 
With its emphasis on tradition—“soil” (territory) 
and “blood” (racial purity)—German National So-
cialism is the boldest and most ominous expres-
sion of political romanticism, which tries to re-
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store the broken myth of origin. This is how the 
duality of human nature takes the first step to-
wards political thought, but fails to look beyond 
itself. 
 The first root of political thought, arises if a 
society transcends the cycle of being and becom-
ing, and attempts to answer not simply “what is?”, 
but “what ought to be?” (“Whither?” or Wozu?).46 
This “ought” does not occur as a continuation or 
derivation from what “is,” but is “experienced” as 
an “unconditional demand” that “confronts” hu-
manity,47 although Tillich does not immediately 
tell us the source of this “demand.” When this oc-
curs, the myth of origin, which is equated with the 
realm of necessity, is “broken,” and human free-
dom enters human history, indeed, initiating hu-
man history. Regarding the other side of the politi-
cal spectrum, Tillich concludes, again with em-
phasis: “The breaking of the myth of origin by the 
unconditional demand is the root of liberal, de-
mocratic and socialist thought in politics.”48  
 To respond to the unconditional demand with 
new cultural beliefs, practices, and institutions is 
not by itself an exercise in true political thought or 
activity. Tillich makes a distinction between the 
“actual origin” and the “true origin.” Tillich as-
sumes that the “actual origin” of any culture or 
society finds its true fulfillment in response to the 
unconditional demand of answering “what ought 
to be?” through an awareness of its “true origin.” 
However, some societies never become aware of 
their true origin and therefore succumb to the 
“ambiguity of the origin.” Those societies that be-
come aware of their true origin recognize that the 
unconditional demand must be concretely ex-
pressed in an “I–Thou” relationship, which recog-
nizes the equal dignity between the “I” and the 
“Thou.”49 This recognition of equal dignity is the 
basis of justice. Echoing the distinction between 
the actual origin and true origin is another distinc-
tion between “mere being” and “true being,” 
which elaborates on the aforementioned discussion 
of being and consciousness, the duality of human 
nature (supra). Mere being is “impotent”50 since it 
is associated with the failure to transcend the limi-
tations of the myth of origin and the ambiguity of 
the actual origin. On the other hand, true being has 
“power,” insofar is it is associated with the break-
ing of the myth of origin through human freedom, 
and the recognition of the true origin by embracing 
the equal dignity of persons. In fact, Tillich con-
cludes, with emphasis, “Justice is the power of 
true being.”51  
 To complete Tillich’s theoretical framework 
requires an introduction of two additional terms, 
“principle” and the “act of understanding.” Look-
ing to Tillich’s use of Schelling’s potencies—and 
here in The Socialist Decision—there is a perva-
sive use of terms that reflect change, teleology, 
and historical specificity. For Tillich, a principle is 
something used to summarize the characteristics of 
a political group, acknowledging its historically 
specific and teleological features, and the impossi-
bility of abstracting its “essence.”52 A principle 
must not be confused with an idea or a universal 
concept: “A principle is the real power that sup-
ports a historical phenomenon giving it the possi-
bility to actualize itself anew and yet in continuity 
with the past.”53 For example, the principle of so-
cialism is not a socialist idea, but “the proletarian 
situation interpreted in terms of its dynamics,” 
referring to the complex set of historical, socio-
logical, and political realities within which the 
proletarian situation exists.54  
Along the same lines, since a principle is not a 
purely intellectual construct but reflects historical 
reality, the act of understanding is not a purely 
intellectual exercise, but also involves an element 
of decision. As he says, “Thus socialism also is to 
be understood only in terms of a socialist principle 
that is gained only by a socialist decision, and 
which is the standpoint both for interpreting and 
for judging socialist reality.”55  
 Now that Tillich’s theoretical framework has 
been established, Judaism fits into the overall ar-
gument of the book in two ways, directly and indi-
rectly. First, in Part One, which is an analysis of 
the principle of political romanticism and its con-
tradiction,56 Judaism appears as the first historical 
phenomenon to break with the myth of origin as 
described above. Second, in Parts Two and Three, 
respectively on the inner conflict of socialism and 
the resolution of its inner conflict in religious so-
cialism, certain features of Judaism would enable 
the contradiction of political romanticism to be 
resolved. 
 Part One begins with a three part analysis of 
the presuppositions of political romanticism. The 
first part discusses the myth of origin, the second 
part discusses how Judaism broke with the myth of 
origin; the third part discusses how the Enlighten-
ment also broke with the myth of origin but was 
then followed by a reaction in Romanticism. 
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While these three parts appear at first to be a his-
torical discussion, they speak to Tillich’s immedi-
ate context as much or more than to the past. I will 
focus on the first two parts.  
 In the first part titled “Mythical Powers of 
Origin,” Tillich uses the insights of myth research, 
depth psychology, sociology, and ontology to es-
tablish how all societies form their respective 
myths of origin. This is where he describes how a 
society understands its dependence on soil, blood 
(race), and a social group, and what kind of elites 
or priests it creates to preserve its traditions. Since 
political romanticism, in response to a modernity 
that has “broken” the myth of origin, tries to re-
store the broken myth of origin (the cycle of birth, 
growth and development, and death), the concept 
of time remains cyclical. Time does not achieve its 
true nature, and remains under the domination of 
space, for “the power of time lies in its irreversible 
forward motion towards the new, towards the 
‘Whither.’”57 The dominance of space is directly 
related to the mythological attachment to territory, 
or “soil,” a reference to the National Socialist pre-
occupation with territorial expansion. Here Til-
lich’s view of the relationship between time and 
space is very important for his understanding of 
Judaism, and this will re-emerge later in the Ju-
denfrage lectures.  
 The second part of Part One is titled “The 
Break with the Myth of Origin in Judaism.” Juda-
ism here is not any particular historical form, such 
as under the Davidic kingship, Second Temple 
Judaism, or Rabbinic Judaism, but rather the 
“spirit of Judaism,” or “Jewish prophetism.” Juda-
ism is depicted as a permanent, prophetic critique 
against any attempt, Jewish, Christian, or other-
wise, to revive bondage to the myth of origin. Jew-
ish prophetism succeeded in conquering the myth 
of origin through the law and the prophets, by cre-
ating a “powerful social myth of origin.”58 For ex-
ample, God used the Babylonian exile to free the 
chosen people from the bondage to land, and 
space. “God is free from the soil, the sacred land, 
not because he has conquered foreign lands, but 
precisely because he has led foreign conquerors 
into his own land in order to punish the ‘people of 
his inheritance’ and to subject them to an uncondi-
tional demand.”59 This freedom from bondage to 
the promised land also freed the Jews from the 
bondage to the monarchy, the priestly cult, and the 
temptation to ethnic triumphalism, a pre-modern 
version of racism. The latter is proscribed by the 
command to show hospitality to the stranger: “The 
claim to belonging to the people avails nothing in 
face of the unconditional demand, on account of 
which the alien can be held in equal, indeed, 
higher esteem.”60   
 The most important implication of breaking of 
the myth of origin by Jewish prophetism is the 
elevation of time over space. Space is inextricably 
tied to the cycle of birth, growth and development, 
and death, and cannot transcend “the here and 
now,” which maintains severe limitations for how 
a society grounds its beliefs, practices, and institu-
tions for ethical purposes. Time, however, when it 
is freed from the bondage to space, enables the 
possibility of something truly “new” to be realized 
in the future, which reflects the idea of prophetic 
expectation: 
The expectation of a ‘new heaven and a new 
earth’ signifies the expectation of a reality that 
is not subject to the structure of being, that 
cannot be grasped ontologically… The new 
being…cannot be derived from the original 
state.  It goes beyond the origin into a second 
phase…the phase of the new in history.61  
 However, according to Tillich, the goal of re-
ligious socialism is not to eliminate the origin, but, 
in good dialectical fashion, rather to prophetically 
transform it.62 The myth of origin has “power,” 
and to eliminate it is to succumb to the problems 
of modernity, which was identified by the dimen-
sion of political romanticism in Nazism. Tillich 
says that Judaism has been guilty of this at times:  
Now it is the tragedy of Judaism that its his-
torical fate not only broke the hegemony of 
the powers of origin, but also frequently dis-
solved them altogether, insofar as no new ties 
to the soil were created in their place (though 
this did come to pass in east-European Juda-
ism). This negative element, the critical disso-
lution of the myth of origin instead of its pro-
phetic transformation, gives to anti-Semitism 
and political romanticism an apparent justifi-
cation for resisting this tendency.63 
In addition, Tillich says that “the spirit of Ju-
daism” is the necessary and eternal enemy of po-
litical romanticism, and that anti-Semitism is an 
essential element in political romanticism.64 Tillich 
is clearly presenting these principles or historical 
manifestations that have timeless features and in-
ner teleological drives as competing in a dialecti-
cal fashion. Tillich concludes this section on Juda-
ism by arguing that only a decisive affirmation of 
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the prophetic critique of all time-bound world-
views can avoid the pagan elements that have sur-
vived in Christianity (which are Christian national-
ism and magical powers attributed to the priest-
hood65), and the modernist, or “negatively critical” 
element in Judaism. A withdrawal of Judaism (a 
“secessio judaica”) would usher in a relapse into 
barbarism.66 
 The prior discussion summarizes Tillich’s 
most direct discussion of Judaism and how it fits 
into his historical dialectic. The aforementioned 
concepts of “demand,” “expectation,” and 
“prophetism” recur numerous times in the remain-
der of the book and due to the limits of space, I 
will confine the remaining discussion to the most 
important instance, in the second section of Part 
Three, “The Elements of the Socialist Principle.” 
In this section, Tillich shows that the spirit of Ju-
daism, or Jewish prophetism, is a fundamental part 
of the socialist principle. 
 It will be helpful first to recall the above defi-
nition of a principle as “the real power that sup-
ports a historical phenomenon, giving it the possi-
bility to actualize itself anew and yet in continuity 
with the past.”67 Therefore, a principle includes the 
historical origin of a phenomenon, its inner driving 
force, and its teleology or purpose. For Tillich, 
socialism not only has three dimensions, it has its 
religious analogue in Judaism. As a dynamic prin-
ciple, socialism is grounded in the interaction of: 
(i) the power of the origin, (ii) a rejection of the 
bourgeois belief in harmony, and (iii) the breaking 
of the bond of origin by an unconditional de-
mand.68 Expanding on what he said earlier about 
expectation as the possibility of something truly 
new (see supra), Tillich here says that these three 
elements taken together constitute not just the 
concept of expectation, but the “symbol of expec-
tation”: “Socialism lifts up the symbol of expecta-
tion against the myth of origin and against the be-
lief in harmony. It has elements of both, but it 
transcends both. Our discussion of the socialist 
principle and the power it contains, therefore, will 
rely on the symbol of expectation.”69 Tillich fur-
ther argues that the combination of the three ele-
ments of the socialist principle into the symbol of 
expectation results in a direct relationship with the 
prophetic tradition, by which he means each ele-
ment of socialism corresponds to one of three ele-
ments of the prophetic tradition:  
For in the prophets…these three elements are 
likewise united: the bond of origin, expressed 
in the form of patriarchal religion; the break-
ing of the bond of origin by the unconditional 
demand; and the fulfillment of the origin not 
in a present interpreted in terms of harmony, 
but in a promised future. This means that the 
socialist principle, so far as substance is con-
cerned, is prophetic.70  
At the end of the book, Tillich, who was no 
utopian, had great faith in the socialist principle 
from a theoretical standpoint, but was unsure how 
things would play out in Europe. In fact, the fol-
lowing remarks proved quite prescient, from 1932: 
The socialist principle is able to solve the an-
tinomies of socialism. It is superior not only to 
the bourgeois principle, but to the romantic 
principle as well. It alone has the power to 
create a future for Western civilization… The 
unqualified superiority of the socialist princi-
ple is, of course, no guarantee of victory of the 
socialist movement. There is also, as Marx 
saw, another possibility: chaos. If in the en-
counter between the bourgeoisie and political 
romanticism, the bourgeois principle should 
once again gain a complete victory, the in-
creasingly severe crises would make chaos 
virtually inevitable. If, on the other hand, po-
litical romanticism and, with it, militant na-
tionalism proves victorious, a self-annihilating 
struggle of the European peoples is inevitable. 
The salvation of European society from a re-
turn to barbarism lies in the hands of social-
ism.71 
 
Part Three: Tillich’s Judenfrage Lectures—
Judaism as the Mirror Image of the Frightened 
German Personality   
 
 In March of 1952, less than ten years after the 
end of World War II and the full revelation of the 
horrors of the Holocaust, the directors of the 
Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (the Hochschule) 
invited Tillich to give a series of lectures with the 
suggested topic, “The Jewish question—a Chris-
tian and a German problem.”72 The occasion for 
these lectures is remarkable. The directors were 
very concerned that their students did not fully 
appreciate the importance of the Holocaust by tri-
vializing it through ignorance and denial, as it was 
not their problem.73 Two of the directors of the 
Hochschule wrote to Tillich stating why he 
thought Tillich would be the best person to address 
this topic: 
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We do not know many people who would be 
able to do this thoroughly enough; in an case, 
you would be able to, and you would surely do 
us in Berlin in general and our students in par-
ticular a very great favor. I [Fraenkel] know 
from our common work in New York, how in-
tensively you have dealt for years not only 
with the problem as an ethical-philosophical 
problem but as a current political problem.…74 
 These lectures, given eight years after the end 
of World War II, represent an early attempt by a 
Christian theologian to address the traumatic 
events of the Holocaust. More specifically for Til-
lich, they represent a culminating expression of his 
understanding of being a German Christian re-
sponding to the Holocaust. As Tillich’s under-
standing of Christianity changed, first, after World 
War I, and then again, after the Holocaust, the role 
of Judaism also changed. Prior to World War I, 
Judaism was an abstraction that possessed certain 
characteristics that should be expressed in a nor-
mative view of Christianity, such as freedom from 
fear and bondage to a legalistic view of religion. 
After World War I, Tillich looked to religious so-
cialism in the hope that something new and better 
could emerge from the devastation and chaos of 
the war. After the additional trauma of World War 
II and the Holocaust, Tillich was again driven to 
look elsewhere, beyond political structures, for 
answers, this time deeper into the human person, 
into the “psyche.” His affinity for psychoanalysis 
is well documented, although he was never for-
mally trained in that discipline.75 In the Judenfrage 
lectures, he applies psychology and sociology to 
Christian theology,76 and arrives at a diagnosis for 
the ills of German Christianity that failed to stop 
the Holocaust. These aspects are present in the 
entire series, but due to space limitations, I will 
focus on the second lecture, after summarizing the 
introduction and the first and third lecture. 
 The Judenfrage lectures are really comprised 
of five parts, an introduction and four lectures, 
with the final lecture serving as an application of 
the concepts presented in the prior material.77 In 
the introduction, Tillich expresses the personal 
importance of this topic, which he has been pon-
dering for decades, that he has had extensive dis-
cussions with Jews over the years, and that it has 
been his destiny to participate in the questions 
considered in the lectures.78 He proceeds to outline 
five types of guilt for the Holocaust, which, when 
taken together, implicate all Germans, even Til-
lich. Without proper acknowledgment of guilt and 
corresponding levels of responsibility, there can be 
no justice and reconciliation.79  
 The first lecture, titled “Anti-Judaism and An-
ti-Semitism,” seems to reflect two unpublished 
lectures written during World War II,80 insofar as 
it traces the historical development of theological 
anti-Judaism from the New Testament into the 20th 
century. It argues that the present period is not 
unlike late antiquity, in which Christianity must 
struggle to maintain its integrity in the face of 
powerful pagan and nationalistic forces. In addi-
tion, Tillich underscores the distinction between 
anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism, as the former 
originated in the late 19th century through “natural-
istic race theoreticians,” and the latter, which is 
encapsulated in the “deicide” charge, that all Jews 
are responsible for the death of Christ. The Christ-
killer myth has been present in all periods of 
church history, and represents “the continuing 
tragic guilt of the church.”81 Tillich concludes this 
lecture by echoing The Socialist Decision on the 
spirit of prophetic Judaism, and the importance of 
the Old Testament. “In the decision against Na-
tional Socialism the church experiences again 
what it had experienced in the decision against 
Gnosticism in the third century: that the spirit of 
prophetic Judaism is the spirit alone which can 
guard the church from sinking back into a national 
religion, that is, to paganism.”82  
 The third lecture does not have a title, but 
concerns the Jewish question as a religious and 
theological problem. For Tillich, religion is fun-
damentally an expression of the experience of “the 
Holy,”83 something that “concerns us uncondition-
ally,” something is that is “the ground and mean-
ing of our Being,” something that has no spatial or 
temporal limits, and something that we find irre-
sistible, “from which we are not able to turn 
away.”84 Echoing Schelling’s dialectic of the po-
tencies (see supra), the Holy has two polar dimen-
sions that are in perpetual struggle—the Priestly 
“Is” and the Prophetic “Ought.”85 Tillich uses this 
framework to explain the emergence of monothe-
ism from polytheism, as the movement from 
“space” to “time,” and how the history of Western 
Christianity, including Roman Catholicism (the 
priestly dimension—“Catholic substance”86), Pro-
testantism (the prophetic dimension—the “Protes-
tant principle”87) relates to Judaism. This lecture 
contains Tillich’s most developed understanding 
of Judaism as “the people of time,” which was first 
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expressed in The Socialist Decision, although this 
is five years after the creation of the State of Is-
rael.88 I want to underscore that, for Tillich, the 
historical manifestation of a religion must be dis-
tinguished from its normative expression. There-
fore, Judaism, despite its uniquely prophetic di-
mension, can be corrupted if it falls into an idola-
trous, nationalistic form. The critique of space by 
time is present in both Judaism and Christianity; 
indeed, the struggle between Judaism and Christi-
anity is analogous to the struggle within Judaism 
and within Christianity.89 Tillich concludes this 
lecture by asserting that “the function of Judaism 
in the foreseeable future is…to keep awake the 
spirit of prophetism, against itself, against national 
groups, and against the Christian churches when 
they fall into bondage to space. The Jews are and 
must remain the people of time.”90 In this lecture, 
we see Tillich’s most mature expression of the 
“dialectic of the Holy,”91 as he draws upon 
Schelling’s dialectic of the potencies, the history 
of religions, Rudolf Otto’s idea of the Holy, and 
his own understanding, in cumulative fashion, of 
Jewish Prophetism, Catholic Substance, and Pro-
testant Principle. While this framework becomes 
more elaborate over time, it is still traceable back 
to Schelling’s dialectic of the potencies.    
 However, in the second lecture Tillich adds a 
qualitatively new dimension to his analysis, a so-
cial-psychological aspect. Tillich was surprised to 
learn that, even after the Holocaust, there re-
mained among German Jewish émigrés a deep 
longing for the Germany before the Nazis came to 
power; in contrast, Tillich would have expected 
the opposite. He was compelled to conclude: “It is 
astonishing how quickly after Emancipation92 Jews 
lent to German culture their creative powers and 
how there occurred, on the basis of a deep affinity, 
a fruitful reciprocal permeation. It is difficult to 
find an explanation for this without referring to 
similarities in the spiritual structure of both cul-
tures.”93 As a result, Tillich devotes most of the 
lecture responding to the question, “Are there 
structural analogies between the Jewish and Ger-
man character?”94 He concludes that there are two, 
although important differences as well as similari-
ties exist. Through yet another type of dialectical 
analysis, Tillich tries to demonstrate that the struc-
tural similarities of the German and Jewish people, 
which are what might be called “corporate person-
alities,” have caused them to be in a peculiar rela-
tionship of attraction and repulsion. Tillich tries to 
demonstrate that both Germans and Jews are af-
fected by, or exhibit, these social-psychological 
features, to an equal degree, if not in an identical 
manner. Since my goal is to summarize, I do not 
want to stop at every questionable turn of the ar-
gument. However, at times it seems that the terms 
of the discussion are shaped more by what Tillich 
sees as deficiencies in the German corporate per-
sonality than what can be empirically supported by 
examining Judaism.    
 The first structural analogy is the metaphysical 
problem of space.95 Both the Jews and the German 
people have experienced a prophetic-reform 
movement in their history—the Jews with the 
prophets culminating with the Babylonian exile, 
and Germany with the Protestant Reformation. 
They are similar insofar as both events ended peri-
ods of idolatrous nationalism, but for Germany, it 
created a “territorial insecurity,” that tried to rem-
edy itself through nationalist territorial expansion. 
The opposite thing happened for the Jews, for 
since the Exile they have become and have re-
mained the “people of time.” Despite the some-
what peculiar historiography Tillich displays here, 
the operative word for Germany is “insecurity,” as 
we will see in the second analogy.  
 The second structural analogy is the “psychic 
split” between self-hate and self-aggrandizement 
(“over self-valuation”).96 Tillich says that Germans 
are ruthlessly critical of themselves and of their 
own people, well beyond a healthy, self-correcting 
criticism, but they manifest a kind that produces 
despair. As for Jews, Tillich says that the Judaism 
of his time possessed a strong strain of anti-
Semitism, exemplified in Karl Marx’s essay, “On 
the Jewish Question,” as well as a stock feature of 
Jewish jokes (!), presumably because of their self-
deprecating character. A corollary phenomenon to 
self-aggrandizement is the sense of being set apart, 
a feeling of “vocation consciousness.”97 Whereas 
in the Middle Ages, the Germanic peoples be-
lieved themselves to be the national center of a 
unified Christianity, this had been lost in the mod-
ern period, creating a vacuum that tried to be filled 
by Hitler’s “absurdities of racial vocation-
consciousness.” For Jews, this vocation-
consciousness is religious, and is open to national-
istic distortion if the religious roots fail to maintain 
a self-critical, divine dimension that transcends the 
culture itself. Another pitfall would be for Jews to 
lose their distinctiveness by imitating the culture 
around them. 
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 The cumulative effect of the territorial insecu-
rity from the metaphysical problem of space, and 
from the psychic split between self-hate and self-
aggrandizement, is despair, “the expression of an 
insurmountable split.”98 Due to their insecurity, 
Germans indulge their “secret wish…to negate 
themselves as Germans,” while Jews, in express-
ing their “lack of self-affirmation,” adapt to any 
situation.99 Tillich extends this reasoning to the 
phenomenon of German anxiety over “the alien” 
and the phenomenon of anti-Semitism. Germans 
are attracted to the external alien, but threatened 
by the internal alien, in this case the Jews: 
We have seen that the Germans like that 
which is alien, in part because they want to get 
rid of themselves and lose themselves in the 
alien. But the alien which they have among 
them they cannot tolerate because it wrenches 
them from the certainty of their self-
affirmation and because this self-affirmation is 
so weak that it cannot bring anything alien 
into itself. From this comes a feeling of anxi-
ety… Perhaps one can say: for the German 
self-consciousness, the Jew is too close to be 
considered a welcome alien and not close 
enough to be experienced as one of their 
own.100  
 Anti-Semitism, as a social psychological phe-
nomenon, is an expression of the German corpo-
rate personality’s self-loathing. Tillich uses the 
image of the German people’s being frightened by 
looking in the mirror: 
…Antisemitism creates in ideality and reality 
that against which it fights. Indeed, it must 
create it, since it cannot find it in reality. The 
antisemite…is terrified by the mirror which 
the Jew holds before him. There are mo-
ments—when we look at ourselves in the mir-
ror—in which we have a dislike, indeed a 
loathing, of ourselves. The mirror tells what 
we are for others who look at us. In many re-
marks of the Jewish bearers of culture there is 
something which for Germans is a mirror. The 
German knows that the mirror says the truth, 
but cannot bear the image, and therefore reacts 
against those who hold it before him.101 
Tillich concludes this lecture by stating that the 
particular kind of mirror that Judaism holds up to 
the German people is the prophetic tradition,102 
which leads into the theological discussion in the 
third lecture described above. 
 In the foregoing, I have tried to illustrate how 
Tillich’s understanding of Judaism evolved over 
time, was shaped milestones of 20th century Euro-
pean history, and was formed by fundamental as-
pects of Tillich’s intellectual framework. While 
not all of the logical moves that he makes are eas-
ily understood, or even empirically demonstrable, 
it is clear that the various dialectical structures that 
he employs are closely related to how Judaism 
functions in his theological scheme. The form and 
the content are closely related. For Tillich, how he 
understands Judaism is a fundamental component 
of his understanding of Christian theology. As an 
exercise in intellectual history, this has been a 
fruitful analysis. 
 
Afterword: Does Tillich Provide a Basis for  
Interreligous Understanding? 
 
 At the invitation of the Israeli government, 
Tillich and his wife Hannah visited Israel for two 
weeks during October of 1963.103 During the first 
week of the trip, Paul and Hannah were invited to 
an orthodox Hasidic synagogue in northern Israel, 
to observe and participate in the celebration of the 
giving of the Law to Moses, known as Simhat To-
rah.104 Both Hannah and Paul recorded their im-
pressions, with Hannah’s being much more effu-
sive, with imagery from the Book of Daniel, and 
visualizations of suffering Holocaust victims, and 
a description of the fervent and ecstatic dance that 
the participants engaged in, including Tillich!: 
“We returned exhausted to our motel.”105 While 
Paul’s comments are somewhat more restrained, 
they are still extremely revealing:  
So we attended the Jom Hatorah, the day on 
which the joy about the law is being expressed 
with music and dance, with Torah rolls being 
carried around and danced around, often in 
great ecstasy. This experience has shown me 
rather impressively that for the believing Jew, 
the law has not the character it had for Paul and 
Luther: commanding, burdening, threatening, 
punishing. For him, it is a gift, the great gift in 
which he glories and which he enjoys.106 
 As noted above, Tillich’s understanding of 
Judaism is highly theoretical, and shaped by his 
dialectical method, and/or shaped by a particular 
aspect of Christianity that he is analyzing. Tillich 
had extensive contact with Jews, although many of 
them were secular Jews, such as members of the 
Frankfurt School. From the standpoint of interre-
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ligious understanding, what Tillich and some other 
Christian theologians of his generation lacked, was 
a first hand experience of religious customs and 
practices of other faiths, and the willingness to 
incorporate this into their own conceptual frame-
work. In this instance, Tillich spent many hours 
discussing theology with Jews, about the nature of 
faith, and whether the Messiah had come. As for 
faith, Tillich’s understanding of Jewish law re-
mained beholden to the Western Christian tradi-
tion, Augustine’s reading of Paul, and propelled 
forward by Luther. Under this framework, the Law 
of Moses was a source of anxiety that highlighted 
the need for an alternative type of relationship to 
God, since the Law was deficient. Very late in life, 
Tillich experienced for the first time how the Law 
could be, for Jews, good in and of itself, as op-
posed to a means to a higher end. It is outside the 
scope of this essay to explore this idea further, but 
it is an open question as to whether Tillich’s intel-
lectual framework is sufficiently flexible enough 
to accommodate Jews as Jews, with Jews express-
ing their faith in their own terms, not as dictated 
by Christians.  
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Reconsidering Commitment: A 
Case for Tillich in Studies of Re-
ligious Violence 
 
Daniel A. Morris 
 
aul Tillich’s theory of religion as “ultimate 
concern” has been haunting me since I en-
countered it years ago. While Tillich’s articula-
tion of ultimate concern is full, fertile, and theo-
retically useful, it also poses a serious challenge 
to those of us in religious studies who would use 
it to interpret our subject matter. In what fol-
lows, I will try to explain why I keep returning 
to Tillich’s understanding of faith, and also why 
I think the details of his theory must unsettle all 
of us in the religious studies industry. First, I 
will review some key points in Tillich’s concep-
tion of ultimate concern (which you in the audi-
ence will find familiar, I am sure). Next, I will 
compare his theory with that of Robert D. Baird, 
a historian of religions who used the term ulti-
mate concern as an interpretive tool. Finally, I 
will turn to some recent studies of religious vio-
lence to show that Tillich’s theory offers some 
strong advantages over Baird’s, even if these 
advantages threaten to undermine the academic 
identity that we in religious studies cherish so 
dearly.    
Though he used the term elsewhere,1 Til-
lich’s most thorough elucidation of ultimate 
concern came in his 1956 book, Dynamics of 
Faith. From word one, Tillich offers a clear ex-
planation of the term, and of its place in relig-
ious life. “Faith,” he writes,  
is the state of being ultimately concerned: the 
dynamics of faith are the dynamics of man’s 
ultimate concern. Man, like every living being, 
is concerned about many things, above all 
about those which condition his very exis-
tence, such as food and shelter. But man, in 
contrast to other living beings, has spiritual  
 
concerns—cognitive, aesthetic, social, politi-
cal. Some of them are urgent, often extremely 
urgent, and each of them as well as the vital 
concerns can claim ultimacy for a human life 
or the life of a social group.”2 
According to Tillich, humans are set apart 
by their pursuit of spiritual—that is, non-
survival oriented—concerns. Any concern, be it 
oriented toward survival or spiritual matters, 
could claim ultimacy in a person’s life, and thus 
attain the status of faith. Already we see a uni-
versalizing impulse in Tillich’s work: any relig-
ion could be described in terms of ultimate con-
cern, as could many aspects of life that aren’t 
typically considered religious at all.  
After this initial definition of faith, Tillich 
explains two crucial components of the ulti-
mately-concerned life. “If [a concern] claims 
ultimacy it demands the total surrender of him 
who accepts this claim and it promises total ful-
fillment even if all other claims have to be sub-
jected to it or rejected in its name.”3 These defin-
ing features of the relation between an ultimate 
concern and a person remain a point of reference 
throughout the book. Tillich’s theory establishes 
three central elements in the life of faith: there is 
the ultimate concern itself, the demand that this 
concern makes (which I will also refer to as a 
person’s “response” to ultimate concern), and 
the fulfillment that the concern promises. A per-
son’s response to the demand of total surrender 
can be an indicator of that person’s religious 
commitment. This is one reason why Tillich’s 
theory has such enduring appeal for scholars of 
religious studies, as I hope to show later. Schol-
ars can use Tillich’s language of ultimacy and 
totality to interpret acts of religious devotion and 
sacrifice in order to underscore the commitment 
of the religious people they study. This strategy 
is attractive for its ability to make religious 
commitment intelligible. But religious studies 
scholars are reluctant to follow Tillich in dis-
P 
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cussing all three of the important elements in the 
life of faith (the object of concern, the demand it 
makes, and the fulfillment it promises).  
Although these definitions and explanations 
are crucial, what Tillich doesn’t say is almost as 
important. Tillich never suggests what exactly 
the content of either the demand or the promise 
must be. That is, he never explains what human 
actions must come in response to the demand of 
total surrender, nor does he identify the content 
of the promise of total fulfillment. To label any 
of these elements “ultimate” is not to identify 
any particular behaviors or beliefs that ought to 
accompany them. Presumably these would vary 
based on the particular concern, person and tra-
dition in question. With this omission, Tillich 
can refrain from equating any one kind of hu-
man response to the demand of total surrender 
with what really qualifies as ultimate. 
It is not only this crucial omission that al-
lows Tillich to guard against the possibility that 
one form of human response will be considered 
the only possible, or the highest form of com-
mitment. Tillich’s understanding of doubt as a 
necessary part of faith guards against this possi-
bility, too. For Tillich, talk of certainty in the life 
of faith must come with significant qualifiers. 
“Faith is certain in so far as it is an experience of 
the holy,” he writes. “But faith is uncertain in so 
far as the infinite to which it is related is re-
ceived by a finite being.”4 Finite being receives 
the demand from the infinite, but because of its 
finitude, this being cannot know with certainty 
whether or not its emotional, intellectual, or 
ethical responses are appropriate. The risk of 
faith is that human beings act and believe in re-
lation to the ultimate even though we know the 
validity of our responses to be essentially uncer-
tain and insecure. When human beings lose sight 
of their finitude, and respond to the ultimate de-
mand for total surrender without doubt and 
without acknowledging risk, uncertainty, and 
insecurity, we are subject to pride, we become 
idolaters, and our faith becomes static and dan-
gerous. Tillich concludes that this inescapable 
bondage to doubt must instill in religious com-
munities a healthy dose of self-criticism.  
How can a faith which has doubt as an ele-
ment within itself be united with creedal state-
ments of the community of faith? The answer 
can only be that creedal expressions of the ulti-
mate concern of a community must include their 
own criticism. It must become obvious in all of 
them—be they liturgical, doctrinal, or ethical 
expressions of the faith of the community—that 
they are not ultimate.5 
Tillich calls this commitment to self-
criticism the “Protestant Principle,” because he 
believes that the faith of the Reformers under-
stood best the uncertainty of humanity’s recep-
tion of the ultimate’s demand, and because the 
symbols of Protestant Christianity are the most 
consistently self-negating. This principle pro-
tects against the impulse to consider any particu-
lar form of human response to the ultimate the 
only or the most appropriate response possible.  
For our purposes, one other aspect of Til-
lich’s theory of ultimate concern is important. 
To have faith, according to Tillich, is to experi-
ence a union of subject and divine object. The 
term “ultimate concern” unites the subjective 
and the objective side of the act of faith—the 
fides qua creditur (the faith through which one 
believes) and the fides quae creditur (the faith 
which is believed). The first is the classical term 
for the centered act of the personality, the ulti-
mate concern. The second is the classical term 
for that toward which this act is directed, the 
ultimate itself, expressed in symbols of the di-
vine.6 
Ultimate concern means, by Tillich’s expla-
nation, a kind of fusion of the faithful person 
and the object of faith. In less universal terms, 
this would mean that, for most Western tradi-
tions anyway, to speak of ultimate concern one 
must experience a union between self and God.  
Tillich even went so far as to suggest that 
the only way to understand religion is to do so 
through the perspective of one who is ultimately 
concerned: “All speaking about divine matters 
which is not done in the state of ultimate con-
cern is meaningless…In terms like ultimate, un-
conditional, infinite, absolute, the difference be-
tween subjectivity and objectivity is overcome.”7 
These passages suggest that Tillich would have 
mixed feelings about the prospects of “religious 
studies” departments, in which scholars often 
make a point of jettisoning their own faith com-
mitments in the name of objectivity in an effort 
to understand “divine matters” more clearly. 
Tillich’s explanation holds that one cannot un-
derstand religious symbols at all if one refuses to 
allow the union of subject and object. 
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Noting this last aspect of his theory of ulti-
mate concern, we might say that Tillich strives 
for “universality,” but not “objectivity.” He 
seeks universality in that his project uses terms 
that are not solely the domain of any one relig-
ious tradition. Terms like “ultimate concern,” 
“ultimate reality,” “absolute,” and “uncondi-
tional” can all be applied to other religious tradi-
tions, and even to many phenomena that are not 
typically considered religious. But Tillich insists 
that “objectivity” is not possible in discussion of 
religious commitment. By Tillich’s argument, 
for true knowledge about “divine matters,” one 
must experience union with the object, variously 
imagined as “the ultimate,” “the unconditional,” 
or “the holy.”8 The detached perspective man-
dated by standards of objectivity is irreconcil-
able with Tillich’s insistence that knowledge of 
the ultimate necessitates a fusion of subject and 
object.9 
This brings us to the other theorist of ulti-
mate concern I would like to examine: Robert D. 
Baird. Baird was a “historian of religions,” and 
he frequently employed a “comparative” ap-
proach, examining elements of Christian religi-
osity alongside elements of what was called 
“eastern religion” in the mid-20th century. As a 
historian, Baird felt acutely the need to observe 
high standards of objectivity. In Baird’s time, no 
less than in our own, historical inquiry aspires to 
objectivity. The results of historical inquiry can 
be rendered dubious if a historian’s audience has 
reason to think she does not have sufficient dis-
tance from her subject matter and scholarship. 
The historian must be able to convince her audi-
ence that she has not selectively excluded rele-
vant data, manipulated sources, or offered un-
warranted interpretations due to personal bias. If 
she cannot convince her audience of a sufficient 
level of objectivity, the audience may dismiss 
the scholarship as overly biased or ideologically 
driven. I would like to register my support for 
high standards of objectivity before considering 
Baird’s conception of ultimate concern. The as-
piration to meet ideals of objectivity ensures the 
production of trustworthy and reliable scholar-
ship in history and other fields. For this reason, 
the ideal of objectivity should continue to have a 
normative function in history and other disci-
plines in the humanities, including religion. 
Apart from the sphere of academic research, the 
attempt on the part of scholars to meet standards 
of objectivity is also highly important in the 
realm of teaching religion. Objectivity has an 
important pedagogical function as scholars of 
religious studies try to open their students’ 
minds to multiple religious perspectives, prac-
tices, and traditions. To lose sight of one’s ob-
jectivity in the classroom is to lead students to 
believe that “only the professor’s opinion mat-
ters.” Of course, when professors work in a pub-
licly funded institution, the ideal of objectivity 
takes on legal significance in addition to its 
ever-present scholarly and pedagogical impor-
tance.    
Having registered my agreement with Baird 
on the importance of objectivity as an academic 
ideal, I will now turn to his use of “ultimate con-
cern” as an interpretive tool to study religious 
commitment. Baird’s use of the phrase came in 
1971, 15 years after the publication of Tillich’s 
Dynamics of Faith. In the book Category For-
mation and the History of Religions, he began by 
making a distinction between types of defini-
tions that historians and scholars of religion 
might use in their research and writing. Baird 
offers three possible types of definitions from 
which scholars can choose.  
1. A functional definition is the act of stipulating 
that a certain word means a certain thing (a thing 
meaning any objective reality including other 
words, the meanings of which are already 
known). 
2. A lexical definition “is that sort of word-thing 
definition in which we are explaining the actual 
way in which some actual word has been used 
by some actual person.” 
3. A real definition is a true statement about 
things that are.10 
Now Baird sees two major challenges facing 
historians who want to define the terms that they 
use. First, all words are ambiguous. They are all 
capable of multiple meanings. One of the pri-
mary functions of a good definition is to elimi-
nate this ambiguity, so that historians can say 
definitively what is meant by a particular word 
in a particular context. The other challenge is 
that definitions can be normative, or convey a 
desire on the part of the user to make a truth 
claim. These definitions purport to find the es-
sence of an existing reality, and declare the iden-
tification of that essence true. In the interests of 
scholarly objectivity, Baird clearly hopes to ar-
rive at a definition of religion that both elimi-
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nates ambiguity and avoids trafficking in truth 
claims.  
For these reasons, he opts for a functional 
definition over a lexical or a real one. Baird ex-
plains that lexical definitions may allow histori-
ans to avoid making a truth claim, but they do 
not eliminate ambiguity. Real definitions are less 
desirable than lexical definitions for historians. 
Not only do they not eliminate ambiguity, they 
also force the historian into making a normative, 
essentialist statement. Given Baird’s aspiration 
to meet the demands of scholarly objectivity, a 
“real definition” of religion is clearly a dead op-
tion. Only a functional definition eliminates am-
biguity and avoids making truth claims. The 
definition of religion that Baird will offer is 
merely useful in the context in which it applies. 
He admits that it is arbitrary, but arbitrariness is 
a small price to pay for the elimination of ambi-
guity and the maintenance of objectivity.   
In terms of content, Baird explains that his 
functional definition follows Tillich, but with 
one fairly major exception. “Religion,” he wrote, 
“is ultimate concern. I am here adopting the 
terminology of Paul Tillich… But Tillich assigns 
a meaning to the words that I do not care to fol-
low. He holds that both the subjective apprehen-
sion (concern) and the objective reality (ulti-
mate) are implied when one sees religion as ul-
timate concern. One might point out that ‘ulti-
mate’ merely modifies ‘concern,’ thereby indi-
cating its importance, and that it does not neces-
sarily require equal attention with the objective 
reference which is better expressed with the 
phrase ‘Ultimate Reality.’ One need not deny 
the reality of the objective point of reference in 
any given ultimate concern, but, as we will point 
out later, investigation of that objective reality is 
not itself a part of historical research.”11      
Baird, then, accepts Tillich’s general notion 
of religion as ultimate concern. Tillich’s defini-
tion of religion as ultimate concern was likely 
attractive to Baird for its universality—unlike 
language centered on terms like “belief” or “the 
supernatural,” Tillich’s “concern” language car-
ries the promise of universality. This would al-
low Baird to pursue his comparative analyses 
more easily. However, he rejects Tillich’s insis-
tence that to be able to speak intelligibly about 
religious issues, one must experience a fusion of 
subject and object. For Baird, one can under-
stand religion from an unencumbered perspec-
tive—indeed, a historian must. He explains, 
writing:  
By ‘ultimate’ I do not intend to emphasize 
the metaphysical or the objects(s) of ulti-
mate concern. At the same time I do not in-
tend to deny the objective reality. Neither af-
firmation nor denial is necessary or desirable 
for historical research. By ‘ultimate’ I am re-
ferring to a concern which is more important 
than anything else in the universe for the 
person involved.12 
One of the noteworthy aspects of this last 
passage is Baird’s attempt to define what is 
meant by “concern.” Whereas Tillich offers a 
rich and extensive discussion of the various ele-
ments present in the interaction between an ul-
timate concern and a human being (primarily the 
demand of total surrender and the promise of 
total fulfillment), Baird’s only explanation of the 
meaning of the term “ultimate” is that it is a 
“concern which is more important than anything 
in the universe for the person involved.” On the 
meaning of ultimate concern, readers find noth-
ing more than this appeal to that which is “most 
important.” Baird steadfastly avoids Tillich’s 
language of demand, surrender, promise, and 
fulfillment. I suspect this is because of his dili-
gent regard for the standards of objectivity. 
These terms that Tillich employs are highly 
charged with normative meaning, and have a 
long history of usage in first-order religious dis-
course. To introduce them into a purely “func-
tional” definition would likely suggest an essen-
tialist agenda, laden with truth claims. Though I 
cannot marshal conclusive evidence, this is my 
suspicion because of Baird’s terse dismissal of 
the term “sacred.” He writes:  
By defining religion as ultimate concern ra-
ther than Ultimate Reality, we have a defini-
tion that is historically useful in a way that 
ontologically-oriented definitions are not. If 
one defines religion as man’s response to 
the Sacred, a prior theological or ontological 
understanding of ‘the Sacred’ is required. 
Without this it is futile to try to determine if 
men are responding to it.13 
In his partial allegiance to Tillich on the 
definition of religion, Baird may have approxi-
mated universality. But his commitment to ob-
jectivity shackles him to the extent that his defi-
nition remains so minimalist that it cannot say 
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more than “religion is the concern that is most 
important to a given human being.” 
 Baird’s definitional minimalism becomes 
problematic as other scholars in religious studies 
follow his methodological lead. A number of 
analysts of violence and New Religious Move-
ments use Baird’s definition and method to in-
terpret their topics. These scholars study relig-
ious communities such as the People’s Temple 
of Jonestown, Guyana, and the Branch Davidian 
community of Waco, Texas. A brief examina-
tion of some telling passages from the scholarly 
literature on these communities will demonstrate 
the problems with Baird’s minimalism.  
 Catherine Wessinger has written extensively 
on New Religious Movements, and has explored 
the topics of millennialism and violence in the 
context of the People’s Temple Church at Jone-
stown. Wessinger argues that in terms of com-
mitment, People’s Temple resonated with the 
examples of the early Christian church or the 
sixteenth century European Reformations. She 
makes this comparison with explicit reference to 
the passage from Baird I quoted earlier. “Ulti-
mate concern,” she writes, involves  
a goal that is the most important thing in the 
world for the believers. People may change 
their ultimate goals at different points in 
their lives, but sometimes individuals and 
groups may be so committed to an ultimate 
concern that they are willing to kill or die 
for it, or to do both. Early Christian martyrs 
are revered for dying for their faith, but to-
day in America, we usually regard such 
people as fanatics, not as saints and heroes. 
The residents of Jonestown died in order to 
preserve their ultimate concern, their loyalty 
to each other as members of a socialist col-
lective. Their ultimate concern was to pre-
serve their community at all costs.14  
Here Wessinger notes that “concern” must be 
broadly understood, and that it can change for an 
individual or group over time. Baird, the histo-
rian of religions would approve: the historical 
data shows that change is the only constant in 
religious commitment, and that many responses 
can all be conceived of as “ultimate.”  
But there is an ambiguity in this quotation, 
too. In the second sentence, just after implying 
that a conception of ultimate concern must be 
broad enough to accommodate change, growth, 
and variety, Wessinger leaves the door open for 
readers to think that there is really only one 
measure of ultimate concern: the willingness “to 
kill or die for it, or to do both.” If we emphasize 
the word “so” when reading this sentence, this 
interpretation could be justified. Here is the quo-
tation again, this time with my emphasis: “Peo-
ple may change their ultimate goals at different 
points in their lives, but sometimes individuals 
and groups may be so committed to an ultimate 
concern that they are willing to kill or die for it, 
or to do both.” By this reading there seems to be 
a spectrum of responses to ultimate concern, 
with the willingness to kill or die at the end of 
high commitment. Presumably those other re-
sponses to ultimate concern that don’t make 
bodily sacrifices would be on a lower end of the 
commitment spectrum, or fall short of the status 
of “ultimate” altogether. 
 Wessinger is not the only scholar of NRMs 
to make such a suggestion. Before offering an 
interpretation of the events involving the Branch 
Davidian community at Mount Carmel near Wa-
co, Texas, Dean M. Kelly describes NRMs as 
groups demanding profound levels of com-
mitment (which he calls “the measure of human 
energy,”) from their adherents. This demand is 
welcomed by those who join: “the highly struc-
tured, high-energy group can be very attractive 
to people with intense needs for ultimate mean-
ing in their lives… For those who hunger and 
thirst for a faith that gives meaning to life, no 
price is too high.”15 The invocation of “ultimate 
meaning” recalls both Baird and Tillich. 
Here Kelly leaves the exact response to the 
demands of ultimacy open, but later, in his anal-
ysis of the Branch Davidians, he makes the 
meaning of this ultimate commitment clear. Cri-
tiquing the U.S. government’s “hostage model” 
approach to the Branch Davidians, he writes,  
[the hostage model] discounted the com-
mitment of the members of the religious 
group to their shared vision and its envi-
sioner…And the hostage model belied the 
cohesion within the group, the reservoir of 
human energy their common devotion had 
built up, such that they were jointly and mu-
tually attached to their cause, prepared to 
prevail in its defense or go down with the 
ship if it failed. In fact, their apocalyptic 
faith convinced them the powers of the 
world were mobilized against them, that 
they were encircled by hosts of darkness, 
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and that their fate was indeed to be martyrs 
in the final battle of Armageddon that would 
bring on the end of the age.16  
I find in this passage a clear implication that 
commitment can only be ultimate if it means a 
willingness to fight, kill, and/or die. For Kelly, 
this willingness—a preparation “to prevail 
in…defense or go down with the ship”—is a 
result of “cohesion,” “common devotion,” and a 
shared “reservoir of human energy.” What of 
other examples of religious commitment in 
which people do not kill or die? Do religious 
communities that are unprepared for armed con-
flict fall short of the level of cohesion and devo-
tion that merits the label “ultimate”? Is the 
commitment of people in those communities less 
than “ultimate”?  
Reading scholarship on NRMs and violence, 
one tends to the conclusion that only willingness 
to engage in or endure violence counts as ulti-
mate religious commitment, and I think this is an 
unfortunate tendency. Though I am sure that 
both Wessinger and Kelly would reject the no-
tion that only one type of human response to 
ultimate concern can be considered ultimate, 
their writing demonstrates a lack of vigilance 
against this conclusion. Baird’s functional defi-
nition fails to function adequately because it 
cannot guard against the scholarly impulse to 
equate death and killing with the highest form of 
human response to ultimate concern. Baird’s 
minimalism in defining the nature of ultimate 
concern, a result of his desire to avoid normative 
claims and maintain scholarly objectivity, does 
not give us the interpretive tools we need to 
ward off this inclination to equate ultimacy with 
violence. Tillich’s definition of ultimate con-
cern, on the other hand, supplies readers with 
ample resources to resist the inclination to 
equate ultimacy with violence. Tillich’s silence 
on the question of the forms that total surrender 
might take is an indication that his definition of 
ultimate concern can account for all manner of 
human behavior. This scope of behavior in-
cludes, but is by no means limited to, engaging 
in or enduring violence. More than his silence on 
this issue, though, Tillich’s articulation of the 
Protestant Principle guards against our inclina-
tion to assume that only acts of violence can be 
worthy of the label “ultimate commitment.” Til-
lich reminds us all—philosophers, theologians, 
religious practitioners, and scholars of religion 
alike—that we must never cease in our critical 
questioning of responses to ultimate demand. 
Once we think we have identified the proper 
response to the ultimate, we must immediately 
ask ourselves how we as finite beings can know 
with certainty if that response is only appropriate 
one. If we think that the ultimate is demanding 
violence as the particular form that total surren-
der must take, in our finitude we must doubt this 
conclusion and recognize the risk. Of course, 
Tillich would have us doubt all responses we 
might entertain in light of ultimate concern, not 
just those that incorporate violence. But this 
pervasive doubt is the antidote we in religious 
studies need if we are to avoid the implication 
that only one form of behavior can count as ul-
timate.  
Alas, Baird’s honorable commitment to the 
standards of objectivity will keep him from ask-
ing the kinds of questions that lead to Tillich’s 
stance. Those of us in religious studies will not 
be drawn to embrace Tillich’s Protestant Princi-
ple in our scholarship or teaching any time soon. 
We will continue to assert that we only study 
history, and that what we mean by “ultimate” is 
restricted to what our subjects consider to be 
most important. But our subjectivity will not be 
denied, and we can never be the kind of unen-
cumbered historian that Baird’s definition and 
method require. Our scholarship will always 
reflect our biases, and we will continue to in-
dulge in our impulses to equate some form of 
response with what is really ultimate. Refusing 
to define the ultimate in any depth does not 
mean that we have no position on what the ulti-
mate really means. I believe Tillich’s theory 
would help guide us to more self-critical modes 
of analysis, and in the case of scholarship on 
NRMs, would keep us from equating violence 
with ultimate commitment. But I also believe we 
in religious studies cannot follow Tillich’s lines 
of questioning if we care about the historian’s 
goal of objectivity. Tillich’s theory of ultimate 
concern reveals our irresolvable predicament. In 
the end, he offers those of us in religious studies 
a perfect solution that will kill us if we take it.17 
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